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ABSTRACT
Tainted Perceptions: Liberal-Democracy and 
American Popular Images of China
by
Thomas Laszlo Dorogi
Dr. Sue Fawn Chung, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor o f History 
University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas
The primary thesis o f this study is that beginning with the pre-Tiananmen Square 
incident o f  1989, American popular and institutional images of China focused on the 
reformist nature the government, but following the military crackdown in June 1989, this 
optimism dwindled and resulted in the creation of an ambivalent cross-cultural 
atmosphere toward the Chinese for the next half decade. When Chinese leaders decided 
to undertake military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in mid-1995, America’s perception of 
the PRC swung even further in a distinctly negative direction; an event that marked the 
outset o f a three year period during which Chinese military modernization and economic 
expansion were viewed as a direct threat to the international political hegemony o f  the 
United States. Although cultural depictions o f China cast an unsavory light over 
Beijing’s long-term intentions, the liberal-democratic philosophy that guided the 
formulation of these stereotypes was culturally reconfigured to meet the demands o f  a
in
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global economy. Hence, America’s ideological structure acquired a dynamic o f 
international applicability; a development that reaffirmed the political superiority and 
validity o f liberal-democracy and the fi-ee-market system.
IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY, AND 
THE NATURE OF IMAGES 
Since global communication, direct access, and more frequent media coverage 
characterize the international milieu o f cultural exchange, the importance o f  accurate and 
detailed information concerning developments in the People’s Republic o f China is even 
more pertinent, because greater cross-cultural contact requires realistic depictions of 
foreign peoples. In the coming decades, China’s international position as an economic 
powerhouse is expected to substantially increase. The recent growth o f large-scale 
foreign investment in the PRC reflects this general trend toward Chinese economic 
expansion. However, cross-cultural exchange and high level contact between the United 
States and China remain constrained. When compared to the 9.9%^ annual growth rate 
average China has enjoyed for the past seventeen years (partially due to direct foreign 
investment), the expected relaxation o f Cold-War animosities have not fared as well. 
American popular attitudes o f Chinese society, especially since the establishment o f the 
PRC in 1949, have exhibited a distinct ambivalence about the fundamental nature of the 
Chinese communist government and its socio-political evolution. For the last decade, 
unfortunately, the less than objective formulation o f cross-cultural images by the 
American popular press has resulted in the dissemination o f highly negative images and
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impressionistic stereotypes about the socio-political evolution of China. As the supposed 
normalization o f Sino-American relations proceeds at an even greater rate, American 
cultural assumptions about China are bound to become more culturally biases, i f  current 
trends continue.
In China and the American Dream, sociologist Richard Madsen argued that 
Americans have interpreted the evolution o f  Chinese history since the Second World War 
through their Liberal democratic assumptions about human socio-political development. 
Madsen concluded his study after the Tiananmen Square incident o f 1989 and claimed 
that this tumultuous event marked an end to the era o f American ideahsm with regard to 
American expectations o f political and social liberalization in the PRC.^ In the 1990s, 
this idealization that Madsen interestingly referred to has reemerged, but this time the 
issues and concepts that characterized the images presented in the popular press are 
emotionally more aggressive and ideologically contemptuous.
More often than not, these reports were based on superficial interpretations o f recent 
Chinese history, a perpetuation o f myths regarding the nature o f Chinese culture, and a 
tendency on the part o f journalists/columnists to predict future patterns of social 
evolution founded on impressionistic and vague images o f the Chinese past. In terms of 
their specific development, the progressive creation o f these assumptions in America took 
place through the gradual internalization of press reports, magazine articles, and 
television presentations. In addition, popular American interpretations o f political and 
economic events in modem China also coincide with America’s political and economic 
interests. The emotional overtone of many magazine articles, in this regard, are often 
highly critical o f  selective aspects of the Chinese domestic environment, particularly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
when domestic circumstances that emerge in China conflict with American cultural 
principles o f individual liberty, democracy, and human rights. More than simply a group 
of facts presented in a sequential manner, the treatment o f events by the mainstream 
media are carefully arranged, in order to convey specific and well-defined pictures o f 
modem China; in terms o f  their emotive and ideological quality. Moreover, the notion of 
America as a missionary o f its cultural, economic, and political standards (otherwise 
known as the “white man’s burden”) with universal applicability, still pervades the 
American media’s coverage o f the PRC. Thus, the actual process o f image formulation is 
an exercise in altering and redefining our deeply held beliefs/values regarding China; 
values that are, in part, determined by ongoing changes in the sphere o f intemational 
economics and domestic socio-political ideals. As this procedure in image manufacturing 
functions in the realm o f popular culture, throughout time, these images ultimately result 
in the creation o f a fictional history o f Chinese society, that serves to reinforce the overall 
misperceptions o f the modem Chinese historical experience.
While American foreign policy interests underwent severe redefinitions after the 
June 1989 Tiananmen incident, they have also maintained tremendous continuity 
regarding the issue o f commerce and investment in China. In the past decade —  which is 
roughly the scope o f this project —  the core o f America’s China policy has centered on 
the fundamental financial benefits that Sino-American commercial contact has offered 
American businesses. Beginning in the late 1970s as Cold War tensions between 
Washington and Beijing were significantly thawing, America looked to a policy of 
increased contact based on trade negotiations. Although the democratic aspirations o f 
America were definitely part o f Washington’s China policy package, human rights, non­
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proliferation, and the issue o f  Taiwan were secondary concerns when compared with the 
prospective monetary gains offered by heightened commercial contact with Beijing. For 
the most part, the ideological rhetoric and the images o f  China reinforced this notion of 
positive trade relations and the idea that economic liberalization in China would 
eventually lead to political reform.
In 1989, however, this foreign policy toward China underwent a radical réévaluation. 
The sanguine vision o f a democratic utopia for future China came tumbling down and 
was replaced by a more critical assessment o f the PRC as an emerging economic power 
operating under an authoritarian political system. Following the crisis and bloodshed in 
Tiananmen Square on June 4 and 5, American policy makers quickly revised their 
strategy for dealing with the Chinese government and brought to the forefront o f the 
China debate the importance of, at least in strictly a rhetorical fashion, democracy, 
Taiwan, and human rights, to mention but a few. As the post-Cold War era began to 
unfold, the various presidential administrations addressed these concerns in different 
ways, while hoping that the slow diffusion of capitalism in China would ultimately lead 
to the infusion o f liberal-democratic ideals within the populace.
Similarly, the plethora o f images constructed by the American press throughout this 
period was founded on an ideological footing not unlike that o f America’s policy 
administrators. Since the Liberal-democratic social philosophy is present within the 
institutions o f both the American political machine and the corporate media, their 
ideological reactions to the situations in China were in many ways identical. Essentially, 
as the objective concentrations o f governmental policy shifted throughout time, the 
images that stemmed from the mass media, especially popular news magazines, largely
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coincided with these sudden shifts. Accordingly, these images reinforce dramatic and 
subtle modifications in American foreign policy, because both o f  these cultural 
institutions, tor the most part, share the socio-philosophical viewpoint that liberal 
democracy, representative government, freedom of speech, free trade, and the importance 
o f  personal expression are universal human rights, are not simply social ideals bound 
within the borders o f the United States.
Methodology
When analyzing the history o f cross-cultural stereotypes and images at the national 
level, the makeup o f a given culture must be taken into consideration. The individual, in 
terms of his/her personal contribution to the culture at large, is the foundational element 
within any society. In recent years, increased attention in the academic community has 
been given to the theory o f  cultural deconstructionism. The deconstructionist school of 
thought has spawned a new scholarly emphasis on the examination o f societies and 
various cultures from a particularistic perspective, especially within the sub-discipline o f 
cultural studies and multicultural analysis; therefore, an added significance has been 
placed on the micro-elemental differences among peoples, rather than a focus upon the 
similarities that bind humans culturally.
Already by the late 1970s, acclaimed labor historian Herbert Gutman criticized a 
growing trend in labor studies toward this end. With regard to this methodological drift, 
Gutman concluded that overspecialization £ind particularization in historical studies, 
without a firm foundation or reference to the greater societal forces at work (macro­
history), often led to a narrow and over-specialized method o f  evaluation. More
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importantly, this approach ran the risk o f not contributing to situational patterns that form 
the historical experience o f  a society at the national level. Gutman further argued that 
“[sjomething is learned from such specialized studies, but in themselves such works often 
substitute classification for meaning and wash out the wholeness that is essential to 
understanding human behavior.”  ^ Even though Gutman was referring to the over­
specialization that enveloped American social history, his insights into the difficulties 
that can arise from such a methodology are applicable to the emergence o f cultural 
history in the contemporary era and the strain of particularization that currently 
dominates this academic field. An over-concentration on the fine points and intricate 
specifics o f  societies and cultures, therefore, can lead to a methodological evasion of the 
macro-picture and the greater commonalities that bind societies under similar socio- 
philosophical ideals and values.
Today cultural historians are divided between two dominant interpretive strategies. 
The more traditional methodological approach applied by cultural historians is founded 
on the interpretive systems o f anthropologist Clifford Geertz. With a contextual focus on 
what French historian Robert Damton described as “history in the ethnographic grain,” 
Geertzian cultural analysis seeks to decipher the “meaning inscribed by contemporaries,” 
within a specific socio-historical environment.'* Moreover, this mode o f  examination 
deciphers the simple parochialism o f traditional (cause and effect) history in greater 
cultural detail, and unearths the symbolic meanings that shared ideas and values can 
create. For the study o f image formulation and how a cultural institution —  in this case 
the media— transmits its interpretations to the culture at large, the Geertzian system of 
cultural analysis, with its attention on meaning, is highly useful.
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Without unnecessarily lauding the academic achievements o f Geertz, certain 
problems are endemic to any perspective that seeks to draw an umbrella o f meaning over 
an entire society. Roger Chartier, well known critic and opponent of the Geertzian 
perspective, argues that searching for “symbolic forms” in a cultural milieu tends to 
downplay the human conflicts and strife that underlie the experiences of humans in all 
societies. In other words, when a researcher places added weight on the importance o f 
shared assumptions (and their meaning), deeply rooted problems and differences are 
glossed over that foster intra-social alienation.^ Therefore, it is absolutely crucial to 
realize that actual ethnic, religious, and value bound differences shape the complexity of 
events that generate social politics at the internal level, but intra-cultural similarities and 
shared systems o f value nevertheless bind the national tapestry of culture in most post­
modern societies, including the United States.
When examining the historical evolution o f popular images, a conceptual paradigm 
through which the culture o f mass media can be examined is absolutely necessary. Jim 
McGuigan argues that in relation to popular culture, “the intellectual assumptions, made 
by some students o f  popular culture, that symbolic experiences and practices o f ordinary 
people are more important analytically and politically than Culture with a capital C” is 
valid.*  ^ As a complementary note to the above statement, Stuart Hall suggests that the 
environment where the interaction o f these ideas occurs is actually a forum in which 
“collective social understandings are created.”  ^ When taken as a compilation o f  shared 
ideas with common themes that underscore their emotive and intellectual qualities, cross- 
cultural stereotypes, over time, are shaped into important assumptions that assist in the 
perpetuation o f the “politics o f significance.”® For the vast majority of Americans who
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8are exposed solely to the influence o f the mass media as a source o f  data on 
developments in China (as opposed to the more objective literature available in academic 
journals), an entire worldview about a given topic might rest completely on images found 
in the realm o f  mass-media culture— with a lowercase “c.”
In every society, the complex of impressions produced by image formulators, in the 
words o f philosopher Michel Foucault, are linked ideologically and politically to that 
particular nation’s “regime of truth” and its political culture.^ Societies operate in 
accepted modes o f discourse, where incoming information and situations, for example the 
interpretations o f politics in foreign governments, are filtered through a culturally 
accepted set o f  values that reinforce proper behavior and concepts o f truth. 
Notwithstanding Foucault’s philosophical inclination toward cultural relativism, the 
notion o f a “regime o f  truth” sheds much needed Light on the nature o f culturally bound 
values and ideals, without resorting to the extremities o f  absolute relativism. Therefore, 
through a combined use o f  Geertzian cultural theory and Foucault’s argument regarding 
the relationship between power and established cultural norms, an inquiry into the recent 
history o f American images of China can yield a more holistic understanding o f their 
nature and function, with respect to the socio-political philosophy that binds America’s 
national psyche.
With regard to the above material, three periodicals that form the core o f American 
popular (media) culture will be examined in this study. Since Time. U.S. News & World 
Report, and Newsweek all review issues, events, and matters o f public concern on a 
weekly basis and form the core o f popular press reports on many intemational 
developments, these three periodicals will serve as the methodological basis from which
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popular images will be systematically extracted. Moreover, these magazines comprise a 
genre o f  popular literature that is distinct from the more insightful and critically written 
daily publications; hence, they deserve separate analytical treatment from other forms o f  
popular literature such as the New York Times and Los Angeles Times. The politics and 
issues covered by these three magazines, in general, tend to be rather similar, and the 
emotive tone and ideological slant (not political) found within these text are also common 
to all three. Rigorous inquiry into the articles and editorials that focus on aspects of 
China and will be augmented by government documents such as the presidential papers. 
State Department documents, bulletins, and briefings. These documents will be 
examined as the primary source material for the foreign policy aspect of the project. In 
addition, secondary literature also will be brought in to reinforce and elucidate the 
significance and meaning o f primary documents. In each chapter, a chronological and 
topical format separates policy initiatives and related images into distinct periods, 
beginning with the intemational political crisis sparked by the 1989 military crackdown 
o f student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. In summary, the pattern o f development 
in diplomatic, political, and ideological motivations that guided American political 
assessments o f ongoing changes in China hopefully will substantiate the thesis that 
cultural and ideological motivations were at work in foreign policy and image 
construction. More importantly, their common liberal-democratic philosophical root has 
caused a misrepresentation o f developments in Chinese society, since China is seemingly 
headed in a politically/economically divergent direction when compared to western 
democracies such as the United States.
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The Psychology o f Image Creation
Before examining the nature o f American popular perceptions o f China, a brief
examination o f  images and their construction is appropriate. Historian Stuart Creighton
Miller conducted one o f  the first major analyses o f nineteenth-century American cultural
attitudes and their connection to xenophobia in his book The Unwelcome Immigrant. In
terms o f its contemporary appUcability, Miller’s methodological perspective offers a
clear picture into the process o f image construction and its psychological tendency for
self-perpetuation. In quoting Walter Lippman, Miller suggests:
Obviously, the interaction of these events on an older image is cmcial. The human 
mind does not see an object or situation and then define what it has observed.
Rather, it brings to any situation or object a definition and then sees what it has 
already defined. “In ... the confusion of the outer world,” Walter Lippman 
states, “we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to 
perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our 
culture.” There is, of course, great economy in such a process. We are bombarded 
with far too many stimuli to see everything fireshly and in great detail, but must 
perceive in categories, types, generalities, or stereotypes. Indeed, such attitudes, 
categories, and stereotypes make up a cognitive map in the human mind which is a 
powerful determinant o f public opinion. Essentially, this more stable, less conscious, 
less rational, and more generalized substrata of public opinion is what the historian 
firequently calls a “climate of opinion” or “image.”
In light o f the above statement, image construction and subsequent climates of opinion,
therefore, manifest in the empirical world as a plethora o f impressions that combine to
form a set generalization. Geertz described these generalizations as “webs of
significance”"  that compose important elements within the overall mosaic o f meaning in
a given culture. Meaning, in this sense, can refer to the basic source o f these generalities,
since human reaction (mental reaction based on culturally laden ideas) generates fi'om
fundamental opinions and beliefs about moral, proper, and correct behavior. Thus,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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human beings are not clean slates through which external stimuli (empirical processes) 
pass in a purely objective fashion.
By examining the climate of opinion and the multitude of images that contribute to 
its development, we attain additional knowledge regarding the core beliefs o f a society by 
viewing the nature o f image dissemination. In an article from Anthropology Todav. 
anthropologist Terence Turner argued that in order to accurately acquire knowledge 
about a particular culture, rather than entering a field study with preconceived ideas and 
hypothesis that might compromise the viewer’s level o f objectivity, researchers should 
allow the experimental group to pose questions and discuss matters o f significance that 
are essential to their day-to-day lives. This method, by limiting the amount o f outside 
interference from the researcher— especially when dealing with the production of 
cultural opinions and images —  magnifies the aspects o f life that are culturally and 
ideologically relevant to the group. For example, in relation to images and their 
importance, by scanning the coverage o f another culture in American popular literature, 
the analyst may ascertain those components of Chinese society that are culturally 
acceptable or deplorable to Americans.
In some cases, however, problems can arise from a methodological standpoint that 
overemphasize the meaning found within bulky generalizations. In the Chan’s Great 
Continent. Chinese historian Jonathan Spence notes that “[i]t is my implicit belief that 
bold generahzations are usually wide of the mark, and that the individual experience 
rarely matches the allegedly universal trend.”"  With respect to the infinite amount o f 
variation that characterizes the individual experiences of people, Spence is ultimately 
correct. But at the national or cultural level, there are more to images and stereotypes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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than unique individual specifics. Strong continuities unite these personal, or in our case 
journalistic, impressions, that otherwise might not bear any resemblance to one another. 
The patterns visible in the specific articles that form the basis o f this project, in 
sociologist Max Weber’s words, can construct “a complex o f  elements associated with 
historical reality which we unite into a conceptual whole from the standpoint o f their 
cultural significance.” The climate o f opinion, when viewing it from the Weberian 
standpoint, “must be gradually put together out o f  the individual parts which are taken 
from historical reality to make it up.” "
In sum, the forthcoming study brings together the most useful aspects o f the above 
methodological systems, to illuminate the understudied link that exists between American 
socio-political values, foreign policy objectives in China, and media images that 
ultimately reinforce policy initiatives at different points in time.
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CHAPTER!
LIBERAL-DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN 
SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALS 
A brief treatment and explanation o f ideology in American society is necessary since 
the controversy in academia over this issue is still unresolved. Traditionally and 
contemporarily, Americans have not thought o f  themselves as a nation with strong 
ideological underpinnings. Soviet communism and German fascism, more often than not, 
are the two pohtical systems that Americans normally point to, when asked to identify 
pohtical philosophies steeped in strong “ideology.” In fact, sociologist Richard Madsen 
maintains that “[mjost Americans think of themselves as having no ideology— only the 
freedom to believe whatever they wish.”* Historically, this attitude toward freedom o f 
thought and action has sustained the notion that the United States is, and has always been, 
an ideologically neutral land where freedom of expression is paramount, and the 
repressive dogmatism o f  communism and fascism are nonexistent. “Most Americans 
would probably agree with this sentiment,” adds Madsen, and ‘Svould regard the 
openness o f mind, the absence o f dogmatism, the tolerance o f diverse opinions as self- 
evidently good.’"  These individuals would also probably argue that America’s 
concentration on personal freedoms is precisely the factor that protects citizens from the 
tyranny o f a state-induced ideology.
13
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When applying the term ideology to the socio-political culture and philosophy o f the 
United States, one must begin to look beyond the historically narrow use o f this term. 
First, American socio-political values contain a definite element o f  rationalism. Mike 
Cormack claims that “beliefs which are held consciously” and composed o f the principles 
of rational thought, can also be viewed as forms o f ideology.^ Moreover, ideology should 
not be seen as an “aberration” in the historical development o f a nation, but rather as a 
fimctional tool that reinforces the cultural or socio-political condition o f  a society.'* As 
Graeme Turner has persuasively argued in British Cultural Studies, individuals are 
usually unaware o f their socio-ideological dispositions that become internalized in the 
human psyche over time, because its application to external stimuli is primarily an 
“unconscious”  ^process of reactions to practices and habits. Therefore, when observed as 
the manifestation o f ideas that maintain a system of order for an entire nation, ideology is 
nothing more than a value structure that perpetuates the life-ways o f  a people; when its 
values are confironted with contradictory systems of thought fi*om an internal or external 
source.
Contemporarily speaking, American society, in terms of its racial, ethnic, and 
religious composition, is increasingly becoming more and more diverse. The pluralistic 
makeup o f America naturally creates a roadblock for the cultural historian who seeks to 
understand nations in homogeneous terms, hence any suggestion in that regard would 
prove methodologically fatal for a researcher. Inasmuch as America is not a culturally 
homogeneous political entity, alternative perspectives are required to make sense o f the 
modem American cultural condition. With this in mind, Madsen suggests that 
underneath the many ethnic dissimilarities and sub-cultures that divide the nation, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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majority o f people who reside in America subscribe to a set of basic assumptions — that
Americans understand as universal truths. For example, John Hall observes that most
industrial societies “are based upon historically high levels o f geographic and social
mobility, and these increase the ‘life chances’ o f individuals.”  ^ Hall’s statement makes
complete sense when viewed in terms o f a socio-philosophical ethic, an ethic that Madsen
argues forms the core of the nation’s social philosophy.^ Surpassing all other common
notions o f the human experience, Americans adhere to the ideal that freedom, democracy
and the “good life,”® are accepted truths by all cultures throughout the world since they
are founded on the axiom o f human reason. Furthermore, the conceptual arena where
these ideas are combined by a common thread is the realm of reason and science.
Madsen essentially concludes:
Among liberalism’s main assumptions is the notion that what is most distinctively 
human is the capacity for instrumental reason, which finds its fulfillment in modem 
science and technology. Another assumption is that the application o f  such 
rationality will lead to constant and universal progress in which the increasing 
economic abundance produced by a society o f diverse and independent individuals is 
complemented by forms o f governance that respect the autonomy and privacy o f all 
people. A final key assumption is that individual autonomy and freedom from all 
external constraints is an ultimate, universal value. Americans are used to seeing 
these liberal assumptions as not culturally determined or socially constructed but as 
self-evident, universally applicable truths about the world.^
The ideological footing, therefore, that runs through the American psyche is the 
assumption that our cherished belief in liberal-democracy is not a cultural construct with 
limited apphcabihty inside the boarders o f the United States. Rather, American socio­
political ideals, by the very nature o f their supposed universality, seek to convert foreign 
peoples with opposing belief systems concerning proper government, ethics, and 
economics.
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Another American conviction stems from the fundamental principles o f philosopher 
John Locke and his notion o f  government based on human contract. Founded on the 
concept that governmental power should reside in a body o f citizens, American political 
thought and social philosophy adheres to the standard that civil and political rights can be 
secured only through a republican form o f government. “Many other interdependent 
principles and values embellish the liberal tradition,” explains Jie Chen, such as “limited 
government, individual liberty, due process of law, self-determination, capitalism, free 
enterprise, [and] inalienable (natural) rights.” With regard to image formulation, this 
traditional outlook has had a tremendously negative impact on the manner in which 
Americans view China. Since this liberal-democratic tradition is in direct conflict with 
the more authoritarian thought patterns o f the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
PRC, America’s China policy has suffered from a socio-philosophical incompatibility 
with the current regime in Beijing. Throughout this study, articles from the mainstream 
press will serve to substantiate the argument that this heritage o f liberalism runs through 
the media’s depiction o f occurrences in China, in addition to the claim that liberalism 
forms the primary motivation (economic and political) for US policy toward China.
Many scholars, including policy critic Noam Chomsky, have commented upon the 
role o f the media in portraying specific cultural images. Arguing from an extremely 
critical standpoint, Chomsky suggests that the modern-day media, as an institution that 
belongs to the network o f corporate enterprises in the American economy, is directly tied 
to ideological presuppositions that permeate the “control pyramids” o f the economic 
system.* * In his view, the institution o f the corporate media is not an independent entity 
that is politically and culturally unrelated to the greater ideological powers at work in
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modem America. Instead, because the media adhere to the principles o f freedom and 
liberal-democratic thought in much the same way as the majority o f the populace, they 
have similar interests in maintaining America’s socio-political system as it operates 
today. Chomsky argues that “[a]s state capitalism developed into the modem era, 
economic, political, and ideological systems have increasingly been taken over by vast 
institutions o f  private tyranny that are about as close to the totalitarian ideal as any that 
humans have so far constmcted.” *^  Notwithstanding the harsh cynicism of Chomsky, he 
addressed an important point in terms o f  the nature o f economics and the corporate 
superstmcture that supports this base o f power. Elsewhere, Chomsky suggests that at an 
extreme level, especially in “free”’® societies, pub he opinion is cmcial to the survival of 
the pohtical regime in power. In this case, power may simply refer to the socio- 
philosophical values of business and public interests (democracy and freedom), so the 
function o f the media, as an institution with similar ideological convictions toward these 
ends, assists the power-base o f  interests in furthering the web o f value-bound propaganda 
that legitimates the vahdity of the American way of life.
Many scholars, however, altogether reject the proposition that a hegemonic stmcture 
o f ideas encompasses the national psyche. Sociologist Mark Gottdiener counters the 
above argument by attacking its innate simphcity. Mass culture, according to Gottdiener, 
“imphes that stmctural or institutional practices are automatically transformed into deep- 
level psychological ones through the agency of media control." Because o f its 
reductionism into a purely economic and profit-seeking thesis, critics maintain that 
hegemony theory and Chomsky’s criticism of neo-liberalism neglects to take into 
consideration the dissenting individuals in society who do not adhere to the precepts of
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liberal-democracy. This counter argument, in opposition to the hegemonist camp, 
nevertheless has to recognize that an overwhelming system of power— liberalism —  
dictates the actions and mindset o f individuals that comprise the body o f journalists who 
staff the American press. Even though a minority o f non-adherents reject the 
fimdamental ideals o f hberalism, the traditional concept o f politics in contemporary 
American society is based upon a history o f liberal-democratic thought; a history of 
thought that forms one component within the program o f socialization and assimilation.
Other aspects o f the media culture also contribute to the manner in which stories and 
international events are interpreted by the joumahstic community. The media’s 
“emphasis on drama thus leads to journalists’ preference for news about current 
happenings.” '^ Stories are chosen for publication in many instances simply because they 
contain sensationalistic and dramatic elements. Done to grab the attention of the reader, 
this mode o f  joumahsm tends to dilute any objectivity that may be contained in the 
report. More importantly, because most journalists covering happenings that take place 
in foreign countries are not extensively trained in anthropology, history, political science, 
or cross-cultural studies, interpretations are simphfied and the content o f the stories often 
lack the level o f complexity that is necessary to properly covey the event. The proper 
political and cultural context is sacrificed in many instances, either because the story is 
visually or emotionally dramatic, or because the journalist lacks the background 
knowledge in cultural studies required for accurate reporting. In addition, distant 
countries are sometimes dealt with in a haphazard or elementary methodological fashion 
(covered only in times o f crisis), so more intriguing stories usually outweigh less 
dramatic day-to-day events.'^ “Violence and disaster” fill the pages o f the mainstream
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press, and as a result, an impression can arise in the mind o f the reader that the level o f 
socio-poUtical turmoil in foreign lands is more common than in actuality.'^ Therefore, an 
“exaggerated” emiphasis on news items with a  component o f sensationahsm dominates 
the media in the United States, and its interpretation o f  the poUtical climate abroad, 
especially in Chima.'^ These problems in foreign news reporting are most visible in the 
case o f America’s popular reaction to the poUtical strife that enveloped China in May and 
June o f 1989. Beginning with the events that led to the ultimate military crackdown by 
Beijing authorities in the first week o f June, the foreign poUcy position o f the United 
States will be anal^rzed in the following chapter, with the concomitant depiction o f the 
crisis in the American press.
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND POPULAR 
IMAGES: THE CASE OF TIANANMEN 
SQUARE
American foreign policy during the Cold War toward the Communist block was 
based on the notion o f  strategic containment. When communist forces led by Mao 
Zedong seized territorial control o f mainland China in 1949, American policy makers 
were confronted with an additional communist giant in East Asia. At this time, growing 
poUtical pressure in the United States, fostered by a domestic need to explain the poUtical 
\actory o f the Chinese Communist Party, eventually led to a poUtical witch-hunt within 
the upper echelons o f the State Department. Beginning with the administration o f Harry 
Truman, America sought, at all cost, to contain the growing influence of Soviet 
communism throughout the globe, but particularly in the third world. PoUtical 
opportunists, especially Senator Joseph McCarthy, accused the Far Eastern Division o f  
the State Department for the “loss o f China.” ' Anti-c o m m unism  was not confined to a 
few shrewd politicians, however. For the next twenty years, American poUtical attitudes 
and poUcy toward Communist China was founded on the premise that containment was 
imperative to halt the advance o f  Maoist communism. In this era, Washington 
inaccurately viewed the poUtical motivations o f Moscow and Beijing as virtually
20
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synonymous, hence an image developed where the Chinese and Soviet forms o f 
communism were viewed as basically the same in terms o f international recognition. The 
United States also refused to recognize the Communist regime in Beijing as the 
legitimate government o f China. Until the administration o f  President Richard Nixon and 
his subsequent visit to China in 1972, low and high-level contact between the two powers 
was nonexistent. To remedy the basic antagonism that pitted the two nations against one 
another poUtically and militarily, Nixon sought to renew dialogue at the diplomatic level 
with Communist China, while laying the groundwork for future economic and cultural 
interchange. Hence, beginning in 1972, a fragile but optimistic relationship was 
constructed that would last until the outbreak of violence in Tiananmen Square during the 
summer o f 1989. What exactly were the motivating forces that encouraged 
administrators in Washington to reestablish contact with the People’s Republic?
The strategic containment of Soviet influence in Asia and the political split between 
the Chinese and Russians in the mid 1950s motivated America to renew diplomatic 
exchanges with Beijing in the following decade. More importantly, Robert S. Ross 
argues that a “shared perception” by both nations that a decrease in the political influence 
o f the Soviet Union was necessary for geopolitical balance, prompted dialogue between 
the two countries.^ Nixon saw a political benefit in seeking strategic relations with 
Communist China, and many Americans were delighted at the prospect that renewed 
relations could possibly increase commercial contacts in East Asia. For more than twenty 
years, American commercial dealings in China were nonexistent. But with Nixon’s visit 
and subsequent political events such as the death of Chairman Mao Zedong and the 
ascent of the more economically pragmatic leader Deng Xiaoping, commercial exchange.
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mostly in the form o f small consumer goods and textile exports, began to rapidly 
increase. By the early 1980s, the nineteenth-century vision of a vast China market had 
reemerged.
Contrary to the Uberal opinion that there are more pertinent aspects to American
foreign pohcy toward China than mere trade concerns, historian Jacques M. Downs
maintains that the basis for American diplomatic contact with China in the previous
century rested on the economic need for market expansion. “In fact,” Downs argues,
“down to the first World War, the United States’ primary interest in relations with most
other countries was commerce.”  ^ During the Cold War, the prospective market that
China had offered in the past was temporarily placed on hold, for the immediate need to
contain communism in Asia overshadowed commercial diplomacy. But as the fear of
Soviet communism gradually waned and the financial influence o f all other industrial
nations was eclipsed by the United Sates as the most technologically and economically
advanced nation in the world, trade concerns once again emerged as a primary motivation
to reestabhsh contact with the PRC.
The United States was not the only beneficiary in this new strategic partnership.
Although economic and ideological inspirations formed the core o f America’s future
dealings in the Far East, the advantages for China were many. As Brookings Institute
Fellow Harry Harding explains, the long-term benefits provided the Chinese with a vast
market for exports, while at the same time scientific techniques were acquired from the
United States to modernize the domestic economy.
Both Chinese and Americans pointed to mutual economic interests as an alternative 
basis for their bilateral relationship. Natural complementarity existed, it was said, 
between the world’s largest developed country and the world’s largest developing 
nation. Americans wanted more foreign markets for their exports, more sites for
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overseas investment, and more inexpensive consumer goods, and they could find all 
o f  those things in China. China wanted access to the vast American market, 
advanced American technology, and American financial and investment capital. 
That, along with the two societies’ common desire for expanded cultural, scientific, 
and academic exchange, might sustain Sino-American relations even without a 
Soviet threat.'*
Since the ideological motivations o f America were founded on the principles of 
individual fi-eedom, representative government, and a belief that capitahsm was superior 
to the cultural and economic stagnancy o f communism, the underlying thrust o f  U.S. 
pohcy abroad sought the prohferation of these ideals. Janet Wolff aptly describes the 
connection between a people’s ideology and a nation’s mode o f production when stating, 
“the theory o f ideology states that the ideas and beliefs people have are related to their 
actual and material conditions o f existence.”  ^ As renewed exchanges (cultural and 
financial) with the PRC gave hope to many Americans for future political liberalization 
on the part of communist leaders, policy makers were concerned mostly with the 
commercial benefits that growing trade with China could bring to American businesses. 
The “myth of the China market” was advertised by the press and many analysts 
envisioned the Chinese masses as potential consumers “o f a vast emerging market.”  ^
Most importantly, many Americans deeply believed that once China opened its doors to 
the United States and Uberal thinking, the system o f Maoism and central economic 
planning would slowly wither away. Instead o f sociaUsm, Americans wished to see 
China as a “land o f liberty, pluralism, private ownership, and free markets.” '^  An 
optimism of gradual modification, therefore, fostered an image o f China as a country that 
would, in time, incorporate these values into its socio-political structure.
American apprehensions about human rights were definitely a component o f 
Washington’s official pohcy as late as 1987, but the supposed cultural revolution that
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economic liberalization would bring to China was believed to be the force or reform with 
the most potential. Hence, human rights and other moral anxieties that Washington may 
have had with regard to the Chinese government were not readily addressed. As we shall 
see later, the manner in which the mainstream press reacted to the Tiananmen incident 
reinforced the pohcy shift that President George Bush undertook after peaceful hopes for 
democratization and economic liberalization were temporarily shattered.
A brief summary o f  American foreign pohcy in the years prior to 1989 is crucial in 
order substantiate the claim that market access was America’s paramount concern in the 
late 1980s. In the eyes o f  Washington pohcy formulators, the reciprocal tradeoffs that 
commercial interaction presented helped cement a pohcy o f high-level engagement under 
the assumption that liberalization in China would gradually follow. Succinctly, this was 
the core o f America’s China pohcy in 1987. Cultural problems and ethnic self- 
determination, well before their popularization in the 1990s, were issues o f importance 
during the second Reagan adrnmistration. The tone of pohcy makers was sanguine, 
however, so human rights, non-proliferation, and the Sino-Taiwanese issue o f 
reunification shaped pohcy only in a marginal manner.
American Foreign Policv and China: Interests 
Prior to Tiananmen Square 
The nucleus o f Ronald Reagan’s China pohcy in 1987 was shaped by prospects for 
future trade. In March o f that year. Secretary of State George Shultz expressed this 
optimism at the Dahan Management Training Center in China. In this speech, he 
outlined current and forthcoming opportunities that could substantially enhance the
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bilateral relationship between the two nations. The fundamental theme that underscored
the entire presentation was the need to increase Chinese-American prosperity in the
coming years. “As the leaders o f China and the United States confront the problems of
how to ensure greater security and prosperity for their peoples,” Shultz declared, “we
both face important economic decision.”  ^ He continued by stating that increased
technological trade was imperative for both the future success o f China and the United
States, in terms o f technological advancement:
For China, for the United States... this new information age will require, above all 
else, that we continue to open our doors to one another. When such doors are open 
— when people, goods, and ideas can flow freely between u s— both Chinese and 
Americans can learn from each other.... But much more can and should be done.
The People’s Republic and the United States have only begun to tap our rich 
potential for mutually beneficial trade. An expanded exchange in goods, services, 
technologies, and investments will be important both to your country’s 
modernization effort and to my country’s economic well being.^
Notwithstanding the positive tone o f the above statement, Shultz argued that for a healthy
economy with a solid foundation in law to emerge, China must take steps to enact
legislation “toward protecting intellectual property.” In this sense, the question of basic
commercial exchange was considered by Shultz to be a given, but America was
apprehensive about trading extensively in an economic miheu with m inim al regard for
the rule o f law.
The trade question reappeared once again when Chinese Foreign Minister Xueqian 
Wu visited the United States in 1988. This time, the focus was centered on the viewpoint 
o f the Chinese government, regarding the issue of Sino-American trade. In a similar tone 
o f optimism as Shultz, a spokesperson suggested that Wu concentrated on an “expanding 
relationship” with foreign nations. “The Foreign Minister emphasized China’s continued 
openness to foreign investment, particularly in the coastal regions.”"  Additional mention
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was given to commerce by Under Secretary o f  State Michael H. Armacost in 1988, when
he said that in the foreseeable future he was confident that market exchange with China
would continue to grow, given the Chinese “priority [for] market development and
reform.” '^ As far as any strategic threats that might exist that may hamper this
bourgeoning relationship, Armacost argued that Beijing reahzed that the United States
welcomed China “as a major player on the world scene.” '^
America also realized by the end o f  the decade that China had made considerable
strides in modernization since Deng Xiaoping rose to power. American policy makers,
historically, viewed Deng as the original architect o f this growing partnership, an
assessment echoed by Secretary Shultz in December o f 1988:
The groundbreaking Shanghai communiqué of 1972 anticipated a time o f  “important 
changes and great upheavals” in global affairs. We have now witnessed more than 
16 years o f profound changes in the international environment. The process o f 
normalizing Sino-American relations helped to launch a worldwide trend of greater 
rehance on political means to resolve serious international differences... The reforms 
in China embarked upon 10 years ago under Deng Xiaoping’s farsighted leadership 
have fostered a decade o f impressive domestic growth and a remarkable expansion 
o f U.S-China trade. Thus, in the economic sphere as well, China has been a 
pacesetter.''*
As 1988 drew to a close, the pace of normalization and further commercial exchange that 
began more than a decade prior appeared bright for the future. Shultz summed up 
America’s sense o f where the world economy was moving by concluding that “on the 
trade front, China and the United States must strive to keep the international trading 
system as open as possible, in order to ensure our growth and competitiveness in the 
years ahead.” '^ More than any other topic o f concern, the evolution o f the Chinese 
domestic economy in a market oriented direction excited American business leaders and 
pohcy makers. By 1989, as noted by Kenneth Lieberthal, the bilateral trade deficit
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between the United States and China “mushroomed during these years” to $6,235 
billion.'® I f  no other tangible benefits could be seen on other fironts such as human rights, 
America was nonetheless pleased at the bilateral system o f trade that had developed.
Even in the coming decade, the omnipresent position o f commercial interests in 
America’s China pohcy would maintain its importance as a key concern. This raises 
some unnerving question about the pohtics and the power of American businesses. If  
finance and business held so much weight in the overall program, what happened to 
America’s principal behefs in human rights, democracy, and self-determination within 
the scheme o f  this policy?
When engaging in this type o f exercise, a researcher always runs the risk o f  falling 
into the trap o f economic (Marxist) reductionism. To answer the above question, the 
American stance on the human rights issue was certainly present in the comprehensive 
pohcy. Differences on human rights surfaced at many junctures in both the Reagan and 
Bush administrations, but more that anything, it seems clear that human rights added an 
element o f moral justification (rationalization) to the fact that America’s burgeoning 
trade relationship had become extensive with the PRC. As a means to divert public 
attention away fi'om the monetary contact with China, the need for greater political 
fi-eedom in China was constantly used by America, if  for no other reason than to pay hp 
service to American ideals in human liberty. Also, as mentioned before, there was an 
imphcit behef in the transformative power o f capitalism, hence the issue o f  human rights 
was not incredibly crucial in the short term. As Richard Madsen has noted, the course o f 
socio-economic development in China was misperceived by most Americans and the 
government. A  cause and effect relationship was thought to naturally exist between
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greater economic liberty and political reform. Hence, the developmental paradigm o f 
world-wide modernization as a set methodical and linier process was applied to the 
Chinese situation. No deliberate effort was made to place human rights on top o f  the 
agenda, for economic freedom was sequentially equated with political reform and a 
decrease in authoritarianism.
Probably the most obvious and definitive example o f this is the publication o f  a 1989 
State Department document that lists major and minor human rights violators throughout 
the world. Out o f the nineteen federations and nations registered on the document 
(presented by U.S. Representative to the United Nations Vernon A. Walter), strikingly 
enough, China was absent from the list. The majority o f nations mentioned in the 
document were in some manner affiliated with the Soviet Union, or were pohtically 
uncooperative to the United States and other democratic governments. Since the 
Chinese government was left unscathed by this bulletin, it is arguable that before the 
Tiananmen incident, U.S. administrators were more willing to ignore the less reputable 
actions that China had taken against ethnic minorities and political dissenters in previous 
years.
During this period, it would be incorrect to suggest that U.S. human rights issues 
were altogether cast aside by pohcy makers. Even though the policy stance o f  America, 
in conjunction with these problems, was quite mild, America was not unaware o f  the 
long-term hurdle that Chinese authoritarianism presented to political reform. In 1987, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Stapleton J. Roy declared that “the stress on social 
discipline in both communism and Chinese tradition will place limitations on how far 
liberalization may go.” '^ Secretary Roy added that progressive gains in other areas.
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namely trade, were moving on the right path; a development he hoped would bring about
“positive effect[s]” in other aspects o f Chinese society.'^ In another statement, Roy
addressed the issue o f Chinese military suppression o f protesters in the remote province
o f Tibet. The testimony focused heavily on the abuses o f power by the C om m unists  in
the Tibetan province, but Secretary Roy commented that China, with its long and
tumultuous history, was partially justified in its current actions;
Many circumstances led up to the recent developments in Tibet.... The story o f 
depredations and massive violations of basic human rights perpetrated against the 
Tibetan people... has been exhaustively reported and documented.... China’s leaders 
are determined to maintain domestic stability. Their aversion to demonstrations and 
unguided mass expressions o f popular sentiment, and to pubUc comments on such 
matters firom abroad by bodies like the Congress and the administration, are 
characteristics o f ruling Communist parties. To effect changes in China’s attitudes 
toward human rights, we need to stand firm by our principles while recognizing that 
as China has moved into closer relations with countries like our own, as it has 
opened its doors to the outside world, it has given greater attention to human rights 
concerns.^®
Therefore, the awareness o f  problems on the human rights front stemmed from the 
cultural tradition o f the United States against forms o f  government censorship and 
political oppression. The philosophical nature o f unalienable human rights gave rise in 
America to a presumption that America’s notion o f political freedoms were not mere 
cultural constructs, but complete, universal tmths in themselves. Even with this emotive 
baggage stamped on China policy, an overwhelming optimism (regarding trade and 
future hberalization) drove policy makers to lessen the political rhetoric against 
authoritarianism in China. Not until after the Tianamnen incident would the rhetoric 
become more inflamed. In the wake o f these heated developments, the American popular 
press would methodically reinforce America’s ideological predisposition toward liberal- 
democracy.
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Lastly, the two topics o f interest that would take center stage in the pohcy debate a
decade later were only secondary concerns for the United States at this time. After the
victory o f the Communist forces on the mainland in 1949, the Chinese Nationahsts led by
Generahssimo Jiang Jishi were forced to flee to the island o f Taiwan (then called
Formosa). Notwithstanding the inter-strait mihtary disputes that separated the mainland
and Taiwan, there existed an inclination on the part o f  many Chinese to reunify the two
opposing sides. However, actual poUtical dialogue was minimal and the necessary steps
for reunification were even slower to develop. With respect to this political debacle.
President Reagan took the position that “[the United States] welcome[s] the interchanges
that have taken place between China and Taiwan over the past year. We hope that
progress will continue in a climate o f relaxed tensions. We will continue to seek to foster
such a climate.”^’ As a marginal item that was not at the forefiront o f  policy initiatives in
the late 1980s, the Taiwan question was ecUpsed by a greater problem that involved
weapons sales and non-proliferation:
Unresolved disputes on the Korean Peninsula, in Indochina, and in the Middle East 
require our consultation and cooperation to promote the poUtical resolution o f 
dangerous threats to stability.... China and the United States, joining together with 
all nations, must address the challenge posed by the proliferation o f advanced 
weapomy —  especially chemical and biological agents and high-tech deUvery 
systems. ^
Therefore, in the years before the Tiananmen Square crisis, these issues —  Taiwan, 
human rights, and non-proliferation— were secondary ones in the administration’s China 
policy.
hi light o f the above material, it is safe to suggest that American interests in China 
during the second Reagan and early Bush administrations were trade-oriented. PoUcy 
makers viewed the coming years in what historian Paul Cohen has termed the fallacy of
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“modernization t h e o r y . A  highly parochial and ethnocentric paradigm for viewing 
history, this approach presumes that China has developed along a path to modernization 
that was not unlike the road taken by western industrial nations, like the United States. 
Modernization theory uncritically assumes that economic modernization occurs at a set 
pace, and in certain pre-defined stages. The idea that economic reform led to political 
reform was one o f these hasty presumptions. After the dream for Chinese political 
hberahzation came tumbling down in the summer o f 1989, a dramatic réévaluation in 
policy forced many Americans and the press to rethink this hasty assessment o f Chinese 
politics. In terms o f the media coverage that reflected this monumental crisis, the 
mainstream press painted a multifaceted picture o f Chinese domestic unrest that helped 
reinforce the pohcy alterations formulated by the Bush administration. In essence, the 
negative images that flowed firom the pages o f various magazines, in emotional tone and 
content, coincided with the changing direction o f foreign policy.
Images o f  Tiananmen 
The road to modernization for China was difficult. Deng Xiaoping, upon coming to 
power after the death o f Mao Zedong, enacted unprecedented reforms in the economic 
sector that brought China into the international commercial market. Gradually, Deng 
moved to decentralize many state owned enterprises, in order to allow these companies to 
have private decision-making power over profits and planning. Deng realized that the 
rapid development o f coastal regions and the urban environment in locales such as 
Shanghai were imperative, if  China was to undergo any major reforms. Accordingly, the 
leadership ordered the creation o f “special economic zones” (SEZs) as a means o f
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attracting foreign investment.^'* By the middle o f the 1980s, much of the necessary 
restructuring had already taken place, and as Harry Harding notes, “overall, the Chinese 
economy experienced the greatest vibrancy o f any period since 1949.” ®^ The fa rm in g  
communities benefited the most from this economic restructuring, because farms were 
returned to private ownership and market incentives were reintroduced to rural areas 
across China. However, the situation in the major coastal cities where much o f  China’s 
basic industry was concentrated did not fare so well.
By 1986, the urban sector began to show signs o f mass unemployment and 
dislocation. In this period, due to the radical decentralization program enacted by the 
Communist leadership a decade prior, governmental revenues began to stagnate 
substantially. Moreover, inflation, a development that was completely foreign to a 
populace that had known 0% inflation for nearly thirty years, also skyrocketed at this 
time.^® Consequently, a plethora of “serious social problem[s]” readily grew, which 
eventually affected the heretofore economic boom in the rural sector. In the three years 
prior to the Tiananmen demonstrations, the “transient” population o f China’s cities 
increased to nearly fifiy million.^^ In many cases, nearly one-fifth o f the urban 
population had fallen bellow the poverty line. In response to these developments, many 
laborers, intellectuals, and state employees looked to non-govemmental means to address 
these problems.
The Tiananmen demonstrations grew out o f the crisis that materiahzed from 
decentralization and economic dislocation. As early as 1986, student unrest and a general 
sense o f dissatisfaction with the regime led to a small demonstration that resulted in the 
removal o f General Secretary Hu Yaobang from his position as head of the Chinese
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Communist P a r t y K n o w n  for his reform mindedness, Hu was accused by Deng and the 
Central Committee, the ruling body o f the Chinese Communist Party, of being to soft on 
the students, an act that many conservatives viewed as disloyalty to the state and the 
party. Hu was quickly replaced by another Deng protégé named Zhao Ziyang, but 
unfortunately for the leadership, the student demonstrators reappeared in 1989.
Sparked by the death o f former secretary Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989, university
students from Beijing University (Beida) and Beijing Normal University organized to
protest Hu’s 1987 dismissal, while calling for greater political freedom and political
democratization. In the early days o f the movement, a high percentage of students
dominated the crowds, but as the weeks passed, the social composition of the crowds
began to change radically. Historian Nan Lin notes that as “the movement gathered
momentum, the participation level reached its height in mid-May, when demonstrations
involved over a milhon participants and visitor. For example, on May 16, over a million
people visited Tiananmen Square and the hunger strikers.”^^  Urban workers protested the
massive dislocation and corruption that Deng’s “four modernizations” created, whereas
students were considerably more interested in the political zispects o f reform; hence, they
called for freedom o f the press, multi-party elections, and an end to the abuse o f power by
party officials.^® Harry Harding maintains that the sheer size o f these weekly
demonstrations caused a crisis within the party:
Of particular concern was the participation of large numbers o f industrial workers in 
the protests, and the emergence o f independent labor unions. An alliance o f workers 
and students, each with autonomous organizations, raised the specter of a popular 
uprising similar to what has occurred in Poland in 1980. And like the leaders o f the 
Polish Communist Party, China’s gerontocrats believed that the only solution was to 
impose martial law.^'
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When the news about the demonstrations reached the American press in the middle 
o f  May, the initial interpretation o f the situation in Tiananmen was quite positive. The 
press saw the growth of student and popular discontent as a sign o f the increasing 
weakness o f  the Communist Party and Deng Xiaoping, so the press became emotionally 
sympathetic to the student cause. The philosophical aspects o f the student’s demands 
were habitually stressed, in addition to the portrayal o f the “democracy” demonstrators as 
the next generation o f leaders in China. The American media created a picture o f  an 
enhghtened hterati (the students) who sought to overturn the “mandate of heaven.” Deng 
and the revolutionary generation were described as adherents o f an anachronistic 
philosophy (Leninism-Maoism), that lacked legitimacy in a free-market environment. As 
Mei-ling Wang notes, the ideological position of the media was fundamentally 
unbalanced since “coverage o f the student demonstrations in Beijing stressed ideological 
vigilance against communism... [and the] good fought evil in the pursuit o f American- 
style democracy.”^^  Therefore, the images presented in the earlier non-violent stages of 
the demonstrations in many ways resembles the non-aggressive and gradual approach 
that policy makers subscribed to in the previous section. Although the bellicose rhetoric 
was at times antagonistic, a belief in the natural progression o f  democracy against the 
forces o f  communist tyranny was not unlike the policy o f graduahsm outlined by the 
Reagan and Bush administrations.
Well before the violence erupted on June 4, the media was on the scene to ascertain 
the nature o f  the poUtical unrest. First impressions of pub he and student solidarity led the 
press to conclude that the nation was in a state o f mass hysteria. Approximately one 
week before the outbreak o f violence. Time ran a full-length article that detailed the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
developments in the square. Referring to the historic visit o f  Mikhail Gorbachev to the
PRC in the previous week, columnist Daniel Benjamin said that instead o f  the world
focusing on the monumental visit o f  Gorbachev, the attention o f the world was on
‘Tiananmen Square, where a hunger strike by 3,000 students swelled to a demonstration
o f more than a million Chinese expressing the inexpressible —  a longing for freedom and
prosperity.”^^  Even more emotive and powerful was the sub-title o f  the article that read
“With Tiananmen Square the epicenter, a political quake convulses C h i n a . T h e  cause
o f the crisis was pruned by one reporter on the idea that conservatives were fearful that
rising unemployment and inflation in urban China might lead to “social unrest.” ®^
Another article claimed that the historical turning point this demonstration represented
was beyond the power o f human action:
There is no turning back today, any more than there was in 1911, when Sun Yat-sen 
overthrew the last Emperor; in 1928, when Chiang Kai-shek won control; in 1949, 
when Mao Tse-tung’s Communists triumphed; or in 1977, when the reformer Deng 
Xiaoping succeeded the ideologue Mao. Deng’s economic reforms have sparked a 
revolution of rising expectations in China, and those expectations include political 
participation as well as prosperity. China, which built the world’s greatest wall to 
keep out foreign hordes, cannot keep out Western culture and ideas, borne like a 
virus on radio waves and je t airplanes and carried home like influenza by students 
sent abroad to learn engineering and economics.^®
The author went on to add that the democracy demonstrators brought China to a national
paralysis. All combined, the mainstream press popularized the image that the force of
student protests transcended the physical boundaries o f the square and enveloped the
country.
In response to the unrest, the nerves o f the leadership were tested in the press to see 
how they responded to the public cries for democracy. Newsweek quoted Deng Xiaoping 
as saying that “I had hoped that we wouldn’t have to spill blood. But if  we have to do so.
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then we will.” ’^ A  subsequent issue succinctly summed up the extent to which the 
demonstrators had ignited a national crisis, in a cover entitled “UPHEVAL IN 
CHINA.” *^ In line with the overall policy o f the United States government that a gradual 
incorporation o f free-market ideas (hberal thinking) and prosperity would eventually 
break down the authoritarian structure o f  the CCP, joumahsts formulated an image o f 
China as an oppressed nation on the verge of a political breakdown. Richard Madsen’s 
study o f the American reaction to this situation suggests that a political crisis o f  this 
magnitude is generally understood as a time o f  negative chaos, so this case was an 
anomaly. Tiananmen was a historic drama where the forces of freedom, morahty, and 
liberty were essentially recreating their society.^^ Rather than viewing this drama as an 
insignificant occurrence in a distant land, America’s ideological stance toward the 
infectious power o f  liberty and democracy led the media to analyze the demonstrations 
from the philosophical framework of social liberation and freedom o f thought.
Not only did the image of a national crisis place an ethnocentric twist upon the 
events, it also cemented an impression within the mind of the American public that the 
CCP’s handle on power was in decline. Dusko Doder described the dilemma that the 
leadership faced by stating that to the conservatives in the party. Prime Minister Li Peng 
was the most desirable choice for maintaining the status quo of authoritarianism. Zhao 
Ziyang, on the other hand, was the more favorable choice for those who wanted to pursue 
marketization and “greater freedom o f expression;” hence the party was caught between a 
return to stagnation or reform.'*® In comparison to the economic and political rigidity of 
Deng, Zhao became the new pragmatic alternative who could subdue the power o f  the 
“old [and] feeble” Deng. Hence, the struggle for democracy was presented not only as a
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social conflict, but an internal party conflict as well. The forces o f “pragmat[ism]” 
battling against the “hard liners” were portrayed as crusaders who sought to dethrone the 
revolutionary guard that was interested in social “order above all else.”'** The notion that 
the conservative faction wanted to restrain the process o f inevitable social reform became 
a central theme in the media. The inevitable victory o f prosperity, capitalism, and 
democracy were viewed in a deterministic fashion as virtually predetermined for China.
At least to the uncritical viewer, the demonstrators seemed to embody the genuine values 
o f democratic freedom and liberty.
The manner in which the demands o f the demonstrators were outlined by the 
American media exemphfies the tendency on the part o f the media to view democracy as 
the ultimate goal o f the demonstrations, when in reaUty most o f the demonstrators came 
out in protest to support social reform, increased economic opportunity, and an end to 
governmental corruption.'*^ The popular term used to describe the fundamental demand 
of the students was “democracy.” Time declared that “a profound seriousness pervaded 
Tiananmen, bom o f  the knowledge that people were prepared to die for democracy.” In 
addition to being the guardians o f liberty, they were prepared to lay their lives on the line 
for reform and freedom. Protesters accused the leadership of “nepotism,” so democracy 
became the “rallying cry of the demonstrators.” It must be mentioned that Time 
commented on the ambiguous nature o f the demands, because many students only had a 
superficial knowledge o f western liberalism. The more common image o f the movement 
can be summed up by Sandra Burton's statements regarding the Tiananmen sit-in. She 
concluded that the students yearned for “the opposite o f everything associated with 
Communist Party rule.”'*^  A brief excerpt from the same article fittingly characterized the
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western interpretation of the protests as simply a revulsion against communism and party 
rule:
The demands may be amorphous, but these can be no doubt about the passion, as 
evidenced by the willingness o f ordinary people to obstruct tanks and o f hunger 
strikers to court death. If  anything, the absence o f an ideology, with specific long- 
range aims indicates just how powerful is the public revulsion at the party and the 
entire status quo.'*'*
The tone o f mihtancy entered the picture when a statement from a poster was quoted 
as having read “Chinese mlers have given democracy and freedom as gifts... we have to 
seize them.” A bold statement quoted from a student suggested that the type of 
democracy the demonstrators desired was specifically “democracy on the American 
model.”'*® In virtually every possible case, media sources attempted to locate signs o f an 
ideological link between western hberal thought and the demands o f the students. 
Although some sources argued that the student’s were devoid o f  a comprehensive 
ideology, statements o f the above variety painted an image o f  the demonstrations as an 
upsurge o f  anger that desperately wanted to overturn the stagnancy of communism. The 
reports were thus tainted by an ethnocentric behef that China had chosen the natural 
alternative to communism in its wholesale adoption o f hberal-democracy.
One o f  the most telling pieces o f conunentary to appear in the press during the crisis 
were the comments o f a student leader (Wuerkaixi) who addressed a crowd in the square. 
The young man cried out to a gathering, “Chinese people still have a slave mentality.
They don’t believe their hfe is in their own control.”'*® Clearly the message in this 
quotation refers to the control and power that communism had over the populace, but 
there is a deeper message in this statement; the notion that by reaching out to the 
democratic ideas of the west through poUtical protest, the Chinese can overcome their
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slavish mentality through liberal thinking and democracy. Therefore, the backward 
mentahty o f the Chinese can be rejuvenated if  the people engage in further political 
expression. Leadership under the system o f communism, according to this utterance, 
binds the individual into a cultural rigidity that is synonymous with slavery.
Placing the protests into historical perspective for the western viewer was also 
difficult. Naturally there was an element o f ethnocentrism in the interpretation. 
Traditionally, the role o f  the Chinese scholar-official in criticizing the actions o f the 
emperor was extensive. Criticism was a morally expected act on the part o f officials, so 
the Confucian hterati played an active part in uncovering/exposing the flaws o f  a ruling 
dynasty. In the tradition o f  the Confucian scholar-official, the press depicted the students 
in Tiananmen as a class o f officials that sought to unveil the dictatorial and corrupt nature 
o f the communist party. James Wallace argued that “widespread regard for students and 
scholarship has not changed,” when referring to similarities from the imperial age and the 
modern-day. An earher article mentioned that protesters were influenced by progressive 
western literature and as a result, they wanted to replace “China’s traditional one-man 
rule” with a structure based on direct democracy.'*^ The obvious connection in this 
statement is that Deng and Mao were both essentially contemporary emperors who mled 
with an iron fist. Political scientist Thomas Bernstein explained the relationship between 
history and the duty o f scholars to act in the interest o f society as such:
The students have struck and ancient chord in Chinese history.... It is the idea o f 
the scholar-official who remonstrates with the emperor about some evil in the 
kingdom the ruler should put right. The emperor won’t listen, and the scholar- 
official takes his own life as a witness, or sacrifice, to the higher good.'*^
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On the whole, Deng was portrayed as a ruler in whom the populace had lost faith. 
Moreover, this image complemented the more important perception that China was 
moving into a new era toward democracy, headed by the valiant student demonstrators.
Americans generally think o f themselves as progressive, forward looking people.
The pace o f the consumer economy habitually reinforces within American society the 
ideal o f  innovation and technological progress. On a socio-philosophical level, societies 
that have not developed such a future oriented outlook are often shunned by the 
American press as backward, stagnant, or retrogressive. Foreign policy in the late 1980s, 
as mentioned previously, concentrated on the need for the gradual integration o f market 
economics into Chinese society, and the progressive outlook that is essential for such an 
economy to properly function, namely liberal-democracy. As the youthful students 
began to look to the west for more support in their quest for political reform, the 
mainstream media rationahzed these developments as the birth of vibrant progressivism 
battling the forces of stagnant socialism. A statement on one student banner read, “Deng 
Xiaoping, your mind is muddled, step down and go play bridge,” while another banner 
declared, “End rule by old men;” clearly a sign that China desired a socio-political 
rejuvenation based on western concepts of progressivism.'*® Other derogatory comments 
firom Tiananmen banners included the call for Deng’s resignation which jokingly stated,
“a good cat knows when to retire.”®® The ideological divide that separated the role of 
elders firom the youth was masterfully presented in an article by James Wallace. “China 
reveres age,” declared Wallace, “but worships children. For centuries, it was the youth’s 
duty to respect the estabUshed order o f elders; now, the obligation is to overturn it.”®' 
Hence, America was confironted with an assessment o f contemporary Chinese social
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philosophy that maintained the path to reform the students had chosen was founded on 
westem-style, forward looking principles.
For the most part, the gradualist tone of many of these images, prior to the military 
crackdown, complimented the non-antagonistic stance toward reform that American 
foreign pohcy embodied at this time. The gradual incorporation o f  market economics 
and greater freedom in business were viewed as the paramount forces that unleashed a 
cathartic tide o f  democratic thinking in China. The sanguine perspective taken by the 
press in the months o f  April and May would soon change. Following the crackdown by 
the mihtary on June 4, America swiftly reacted with a staunch condemnation o f the 
government’s actions. After the regime moved to suppress the demonstrations, American 
pohcy makers began to emphasize the unpredictable nature o f  the Communist leadership.
The Image o f the Massacre in Policv 
and the Press
Beginning with the mihtary suppression on the night o f June 3, America’s image of 
the Tiananmen demonstration turned into a nightmare. A wholesale condemnation o f  the 
government’s decision to use violence on the part o f the government pervaded the images 
that the press perpetuated. The hopeful situation that joumahsts sohcited in May now 
degenerated into a deep cynicism.
No one can forget the historic photograph of the lonely demonstrator standing in 
front of the row o f moving tanks, ready to sacrifice his life for his fellow comrades. In 
response to the military’s involvement in the situation, George Bush immediately cited 
the example o f the lone demonstrator as an image that would haunt China for many years
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to come. Without hesitancy. President Bush stated that the United States deplored the use
o f  force against the students and called on the Chinese government to exercise restraint in
dealing with the incident. Bush added that “the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were
advocating basic human rights, including the freedom o f  expression, freedom o f the
press, [and] freedom o f association. These goals we support around the w o r l d . I n  a
statement o f moral support for the student cause. Bush declared:
Throughout the world we stand with those who seek greater freedom and democracy. 
This is the strongly felt view o f  my administration, o f our Congress, and most 
important, o f the American people.®®
As a consolation to the democratic elements in China who looked to the west for moral
encouragement. Bush said that America was completely in favor o f  the “budding of
democracy” that overtook Beijing in the weeks prior. The Washington administration
now seemed more restrained about the process o f democratization, so policy changes
were made that reflected America’s growing unease with the Communists in Beijing.
Although some measures were taken to show American displeasure for the sudden
bloodshed, the most essential aspect o f the previous policy was left unaltered. Hence, a
number o f initiatives o f lesser significance were enacted, but economic exchange and
basic commerce was left untouched. In his June 5 press conference, George Bush
outlined the steps that the administration had taken to protest China’s brutal measures. A
review o f student visas for extended stays o f residency, suspension o f high level military
contact, and a halt to all commercial weapons exports, was essentially Bush’s response to
the Tiananmen crackdown. On the more pertinent issue o f possible sanctions against
China, Bush eloquently answered:
On the commercial side, I don’t want to hurt the Chinese people. I happen to believe 
that the commercial contacts have led, in essence, to this quest for more freedom. I
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think as people have commercial incentive, whether it’s in China or in other 
totalitarian systems, the move to democracy becomes more inexorable/'^
Consequently, Bush was not willing to renege on the policy o f  economic engagement that
brought prosperity to China, and o f course the Untied States. Minor variations in policy
was the extent to which the administration was willing to move on the China issue.
In subsequent weeks, the focus o f the administration shifted to a concentration on
human rights and its suppression in contemporary China. On June 8, at a press
conference regarding the turbulent situation in the PRC, the President commented that
“we [America] aren’t going to remake the world, but we should stand for something.”^^
In this statement. Bush spoke o f  the notion that human rights need to become more of a
central issue in America’s dealings with China. Moreover, on the question o f how this
tension in contact with China can be eased in the future. Bush simply answered “it will
take a recognition o f human rights o f individuals and a respect for the right o f those who
disagree [with the govemment].”^^  These amendments to the current poUcy brought the
more critical aspects of America’s image of China to the forefront o f the policy debate,
but the economic basis for relations with the PRC were left unchanged.
In light o f these policy changes, a clear pattern o f image formulation began to
reinforce the new set o f ideological alterations that underscored the administration’s
move to place human rights violations at the center o f its reconstructed policy, while
maintaining commercial relations as normal. A Time article mentioned that although the
United States deplored the use o f  force in quelling the protests, it was unwilling to
“jeopardize” the decade-long “strategic relationship” that the two nations had painfully
constructed.^^ A further report argued that continued economic relations with China,
even after the incident in Tiananmen, was expected eventually/soon to contribute even
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further toward the democratization o f Chinese society. In the coming years, disaffected
Chinese citizens might once again collectively bring pressure upon the government for
reform in the political and economic spheres. No small mention was made o f this
possibility by jourrriist George J. Church when he wrote:
Even after the Tiananmen Square massacre. Bush and his aides still hope that 
continued American trade and investment will help maintain economic fireedom and 
that the dynamic force o f a liberalized economy may yet renew the pressure for 
political reform.... Corporate executives would like nothing better. Western 
businessmen have dreamed o f immense markets in China since the days o f  Marco 
Polo; for American corporations in the past few years, the dream started to come 
true. From a mere $1.2 billion ten years earlier, U.S. trade with China rocketed to 
$13.4 billion last year, including almost $5 billion o f U.S. exports...
Concerning the image o f human rights and the atrocities committed by the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) at Tiananmen, Bush’s spokesperson was cited by Newsweek as
having said that the Communist “government has murdered many of its own citizens.” In
a subsequent article the memories o f  a Harvard University graduate student recalled:
It was like a dream. From where I was, the sound of crying was louder than the 
gunfire, but I kept seeing people falling. One line of students would stand up and get 
shot down and then another line o f student would stand and the same thing would 
happen. There was gunfire from all directions. The soldiers were shooting 
everyone. I don’t often cry. I went through the Cultural Revolution. I was sent to a 
remote region of China, on the border between China and Vietnam, and I have gone 
through a lot. But I couldn’t help crying. I just cannot believe what I saw in Beijing. 
My worst memory, the strongest impression, was that I saw a tank run over a man 
and I heard a kind o f noise, like a pong. And after that we saw his head, and it was 
crushed... Later I saw four or five students hiding behind a low brick wall. They 
were all crushed by a tank. The tank went to that wall because they were hiding 
there. They shot students out o f the trees. What I saw is bodies, bodies, bodies.^^
A dramatic condemnation of the military crackdown ensued in the weeks following the
event, which reinforced the notion in the mind o f the American public that the
Communists were definitely human rights violators of the worst kind; tyrants willing to
suppress unarmed demonstrators seeking nothing but the unalienable rights o f democracy
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and freedom. President Bush had responded in kind with a call for restraint and political 
recognition o f  those seeking freedom the day after the incident, hence the press 
masterfully constructed an incredibly horrific scenario o f  the events that coincided with 
the revised policy o f  the administration.
In summary, after the Tiananmen Square “massacre,” the American government 
began to focus intensively on the highly negative and unpredictable nature o f  the regime 
in China. In addition, the possibility that China in the coming years could very well 
become an aggressive economic and military giant in the region, was also another factor 
that moved to the forefront o f the policy debate. Even though the economic stance o f the 
United States remained much the same after the incident, emphasis was increasingly 
placed on non-proliferation, the nature o f the communist regime, human rights, Chinese 
expansionism, and relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Because the images that the 
press produced were so volatile and culturally biased, the first chapter o f  a fictional 
history regarding the socio-political evolution o f  China was created in the media.
Because American institutions such as the government and the press have a unique 
missionary nature, in terms of propagating American ideals abroad, the returned images 
about the socio-political climate in China were tainted with an ethnocentric negativity. 
Policy makers and the media refused to look past the blood that had been spilled in 
Beijing to ascertain the true nature o f the incident, therefore, a skewed impression o f 
these two tumultuous months was presented to the public, with only minimal information 
about the deeper political, social, and cultural elements o f the Tiananmen fiasco.
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IMAGES IN THE AFTERMATH OF TIANANMEN:
THE ERA OF UNCERTAINTY 
In the wake o f  the Tiananmen incident, American foreign policy toward China 
underwent a thorough réévaluation. Formerly held assumptions, o f which the trajectory 
o f Chinese political and economic reform were the most pertinent, were cast aside while 
pohcy makers scrambled to digest the unexpected steps the CCP had taken to quell a 
possible social revolution. The policy o f overt optimism that carried American foreign 
policy through both the Reagan and Bush administrations effectively disappeared. The 
notion that ongoing economic reform with the introduction o f  market incentives would 
steer China toward the path o f enhanced political freedom did not altogether vanish, but a 
mood o f gradual uncertainty and apprehension regarding the nature o f Chinese 
politics/economics replaced the optimism o f the previous period. For two decades prior 
to the Tiananmen incident, observers in the United States witnessed an unprecedented 
relaxation in the totalitarian socio-political policies o f the PRC. In the aftermath o f the 
1989 military crackdown, popular images and policy initiatives were culturally adapted to 
meet the needs o f the post-Cold War political climate. In effect, popular and 
administrative conceptions centered on the unpredictable nature o f the PRC and the 
Chinese political machine, in terms o f its adoption of an unorthodox socialist-market
46
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economy, coupled with its emergence as a  regional power. The American expectation for 
future liberalization remained an intricate aspect o f  America’s vision o f China, but 
reports in government and the press increasingly stressed the tyrannical nature o f  Chinese 
politics, since religious, ethnic, and political dissent were repeatedly suppressed by 
Chinese authorities during this period.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the foundation o f Sino-American relations 
throughout the 1980s was based on a desire for enhanced commercial exchange. 
Accordingly, issues pertaining to human rights, non-proliferation, and Taiwan were 
relegated to second-class positions o f concern, because the prospective gains o f trade 
outweighed any moral hesitations that policy makers had about the continued suppression 
of religious and pohtical dissent in China. As the events following 1989 unfolded, even 
though presidents Bush and William Clinton reaffirmed the necessity o f intensive 
commercial contact with China, concerns regarding human rights, Taiwan, and Beijing’s 
military capabilities came to the fore o f the policy debate. In essence, between 1990 and 
1996, administrative appeals for a reaffirmation of Sino-American trade continued as 
they had in the years preceding Tiananmen, but the moral and strategic aspects o f the 
previous policy began to receive more public attention. Ultimately, the American desire 
to construct a China market based on firee-market, democratic principles drove the Bush 
and Clinton administrations to engage the PRC firom a dualistic perspective. For one, 
policy specifics concentrated on the image that China was quickly becoming a major 
trading ally of the United States, and that access to its markets offered enormous trading 
opportunities for potential investors. Secondly, China, with the memories o f the 
Tiananmen crackdown still firesh in the minds o f American officials, was increasingly
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viewed as a nation that exhibited characteristics o f  political unpredictability; a nation that 
periodically violated international standards o f human rights, economic modernization, 
and regional political interaction.
A Policv o f Ambivalence 
In examining this policy o f  ambivalence undertaken by the United States, its 
uniqueness becomes apparent almost immediately when compared to other nations that 
do not maintain extensive commercial ties with American businesses. For example, 
American condenmation of North Korean totalitarianism is not only rhetorically tied to 
its policy o f political and economic isolation, it also forms the core o f a rigid policy that 
virtually excluded the Stalinist state from economic interaction with the international 
community. Chinese communism receives a similar degree o f moral/political criticism 
from the US, but American commercial investment in China, according to Julia Chang 
Bloch, has increased by approximately 620 percent between the years o f 1990 and 1995.* 
Moreover, American capital in 1995 accounted for 9.6 percent o f “total foreign 
investment” in that year, and the financial interaction of American companies with 
Chinese enterprises has swelled within the last decade as well. Additional research 
conducted by Bloch suggests that the vast majority o f American businesses operating in 
China are satisfied with their overseas ventures, given that most western companies are 
profiting heavily from the benefits of low manufacturing costs in the PRC.^ Hence, when 
juxtaposed with the North Korean situation and the apparent absence of economic links 
between the two nations, it becomes clear that although American ideological 
motivations regarding communism initially repel even the staunchest conservative
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politicians from advocating improved bilateral relations with Beijing, the material 
rewards o f a expanding market are difficult to ignore politically. Since business access 
retained its preeminent position as the center-piece o f  America’s China policy even after 
the Tiananmen crackdown, moral aversion toward the repressive and stifling nature o f 
communism collided with the allure of monetary gain in a policy o f economic-moral 
dualism.
For the purpose o f  image analysis, the following paragraphs detail the combined 
policy initiatives o f  the Bush and Clinton administrations. Given that the official policy 
o f  both presidents exhibited tremendous continuity in their respective approaches toward 
managing China policy, the forthcoming section examines primary source material 
between 1989 and 1996. Thus, the presentation of data will not necessarily follow a time 
order sequence. Instead, the material is compiled and formatted in a manner that reflects 
the level o f importance o f  each issue in the era o f uncertainty.
Beginning with the Tiananmen incident and ending with the Taiwan strait crisis o f 
1995-96, America’s foreign policy stance on China was characterized by a moral- 
economic dualism, fri this period, administrators were caught between a desire to 
enhance American trade with the PRC, and coming to terms with the perceived direction 
o f  Chinese socio-political developments. The conservative oligarchy, led by Deng 
Xiaoping, speedily shored up military and bureaucratic support for their program in 1990. 
The reform minded elite in the CCP were effectively removed from power after the 
military crackdown in the square, but the party was, nevertheless, forced to make 
minimal concessions in the name o f enhanced democracy and political pluralism. Hence, 
Deng’s faction, now the only group with majority power in the ranks o f the party, called
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on the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) to offer additional 
constructive criticism pertaining to corruption and greater democracy. Although this was 
definitely a step in the direction o f  reform for Beijing leaders, the political supremacy of 
Marxism and the CCP were simultaneously reaffirmed/ All measures in the avenue of 
democratic entitlements relegated to extra-party bodies, such as the CPPCC, required the 
tacit approval o f the party, i f  suggestions and recommendations were implemented. As 
the Bush administration witnessed these happenings, officials concluded that 
authoritarianism had once again become victorious in China. The realization that radical 
communists had secured their position in Beijing fostered a sense o f unease in American 
government, but the commercial linkage that had evolved through a decade o f vigorous 
Sino-American bilateral contact was left intact.
With this in mind, policy makers publicly reaffirmed American trade commitments 
to the PRC. Officials repeatedly turned to a description o f the post-Cold War era as one 
in which the global community had become increasingly interdependent. Since the pace 
o f global economic interaction substantially increased after the fall o f the Soviet Union, 
officials saw a certain futility in excluding China fi-om the global marketplace. The 
ascent o f the multinational corporation, a political entity that demanded open access to 
markets world-wide, drove American trade policy by its insistence on enhanced 
profitability, via a right o f entry to the PRC. In a politically empirical sense, the 
multinational corporation had replaced the ideologically divided superpowers o f  the Cold 
War, as a collective set o f interests with the ability to exert political weight o f immense 
proportions.
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Even before the fall o f communism, as Kenneth Mason has observed, multinational 
companies were becoming the most important political-economic institutions o f the late 
twentieth century/ Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard H. 
Solomon described the global setting similarly by stating, “[t]he dominant trends o f this 
new era, which will shape the world o f the 21** century, are an increasingly integrated 
global economy sparked by spectacular technological change; the bankruptcy of 
communism as an economic and political alternative, and a world-wide trend toward 
democracy and fi’ee enterprise.”  ^ In addition, Solomon maintained that in relation to the 
economy, America had a stake in sustaining current levels o f growth, because 
engagement with East Asia partially accounted for the dynamics o f the burgeoning 
American economy. “U.S. trade with East Asia,” Solomon declared, “now accounts for 
more than one-third of our total foreign commerce, and our exports to East Asia now 
exceed those to Europe.”  ^ In sum, globalization, with China as an intricate part o f the 
multinational puzzle, influenced the trajectory o f foreign policy, because the unimpeded 
flow o f  capital to export markets, even to nations with questionable political systems, 
was a  prerequisite for success in post-communist economics.
Although not as rhetorically secure in their assertion as before the Tiananmen crisis, 
administrators stressed their belief in the reformist nature o f economic liberalization, and 
its direct impact on the political climate o f  a nation. In a 1996 interview. President Bill 
Clinton summed up this argument when stating, ‘T believe they’re more likely to become 
democratic i f  they progress economically... [because] economic development and 
democracy will go hand in hand.”  ^ In actuality, given the tone o f the above statement.
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the core o f the pre-Tiananmen policy initiatives were carried into the next decade Hby 
subsequent administrations.
Prior to Tiananmen, human rights, the issue o f Taiwan, and China’s military 
capabilities, for the most part, were divorced from the issue o f bilateral commerce. These 
facets o f policy were relegated to positions o f  marginal concern and were overshaciowed 
by the administrative yearnings for open access to the Chinese economy. These 
previously diffused aspects o f international relations merged in the era o f uncertaimty 
with the issue o f  China trade, which advanced the idea that moral considerations amd 
tangible gains for America were necessary in order to continue the current import-esxport 
relationship.
One area in which the fusion of economic and moral imperatives collided was #on the 
question o f public benefits that bilateral relations presented for average Americans. 
Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, in a 1996 testimony presented to the House W ay's and 
Means Trade Subcommittee, testified that Americans owed much to bilateral comnuerce 
with the PRC, because the existence o f as many as 160,000 jobs in the United S ta tes were 
associated with American exports to China.* The pre-Tiananmen justifications offerred by 
administrative officials differed greatly from the above statement. Before, lucrative- 
benefits for business in China stood as the primary reason for a need to further 
commercial interaction, but in the early 1990s, appeals to popular support became nnore 
numerous by claiming that bilateral trade was profitable for average citizens in the fibrm 
o f growing employment opportunities associated with exports to East Asia.
Scholars who study the periodic alterations o f policy in relation to domestic factors 
and political variables site the growing influence o f American populism for this sh if t  in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
attitudes. In the United States, political constituents, in the form o f patriotic citizens who 
view globalism as a threat to American sovereignty, form a  substantial portion o f the 
domestic voting block. Many Americans, particularly farmers from the Midwest and 
other agriculturally productive regions, perceive the political affluence o f  multinational 
corporations and the relocation o f production facilities as a process that will ultimately 
undermine America’s political sovereignty and economic security. David M. Lampton 
argues that these nationalistic sentiments contributed to the amplification o f nationalistic 
populism in the early 1990s, as politicians, namely Pat Buchanan, sought to harness the 
political weight o f these disenchanted elements within the American body politic.^
Within the post-Tiananmen socio-political miheu, outright appeals for corporate market 
fortification became insufficient, so policy makers presented the public with greater 
assurance that commercial contact with China was morally and nationally beneficial to 
average Americans, many o f whom were under the distinct impression that American 
jobs were being transplanted to a nation that functioned under questionable economic, 
social, and political principles.
The unpredictable nature o f Chinese culture was another variable that contributed to 
the proliferation o f the image that China operated under unorthodox modes o f political- 
economic advancement. Notwithstanding the positive tone o f Clinton’s prediction that 
commercial liberalization fostered political reform, the expectations o f a smooth 
transition to wholesale capitalism and democracy were generally more reserved in this 
period. In 1990, the State Department announced that within the Chinese heritage, an 
adherence to tradition and custom prevented reform from occurring at a rapid pace. A 
tradition o f centralized authority, communal security, and elite political conflict in
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decision making were barriers to modernization that needed international recognition.
For functional relations to move forward. Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger maintained 
that these time-honored customs were deeply imbedded in the Chinese, and America 
needed to bridle any unrealistic expectations for overnight reform in China. Additional 
images o f Chinese cultural anachronism appeared in 1996 as well, when Under Secretary 
o f  State for Political Affairs Peter Tam off commented that the Chinese nation, as a 
important component o f international politics, had yet to comply with internationally 
recognized norms and behavioral standards, in terms o f the regime’s political behavior. 
With regard to economic restructuring, Jan Prybyla noted that a “gradualist and relatively 
pragmatic approach to institutional reform” had been the trademark o f Chinese 
restructuring since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping enacted his program for national 
modernization. * * More importantly, the 1989 ascent o f the conservative oligarchy stalled 
the abandonment o f these moderate policies, a process the United States hoped would 
progressively quicken. For this reason, Tamoff explained, “China [was] at a critical 
juncture,” and the United States needed to act as an “encouraging” agent for the Chinese 
people.*^ Therefore, if  China was to become an equal player in multinational commerce, 
the overarching hand o f government regulation and political rigidity required jettisoning. 
In summary, the image o f China from these various government publications suggests 
that a dualistic ambivalence o f market engagement and political uncertainty battled for 
preeminence in this phase of Sino-American relations.
The most fiercely debated aspect o f the cross-cultural ambivalence discussed above 
is the annual congressional renewal o f Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for the PRC.
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To avoid an international confrontation with Beijing, President Bush resisted 
congressional appeals for a revocation o f MFN following the Tiananmen crackdown. 
Under the provisions of MFN, nations with vibrant market economies and democratic 
systems o f government are awarded the status permanently, however, non-market 
economies, due to the Jackson-Vanik amendment in the Trade Act o f 1974, are granted 
MFN on an annual basis only. As a tool for leverage against the human rights practices 
o f China, MFN became the yearly centerpiece o f debate among proponents and 
opponents o f  China trade. As an issue o f contention, the granting of MFN to a regime 
that stifled democratic outpourings and suppressed anti-communist dissent has, at times, 
strained Sino-American relations.*'*
Interestingly enough, since Tiananmen, a presidential-congressional rift has 
materialized regarding the MFN issue; a conflict pitting congressional hard-liners who 
denounce Chinese authoritarianism against proponents o f free-trade and intensive 
marketization. Congress views the clause o f annual renewal as a yearly monitoring 
mechanism that functions as an incentive for the Chinese government in improving its 
human rights record. The Bush and Clinton administrations claimed that by granting 
China MFN, the liberalizing effect o f intensive market expansion would assist the cause 
o f human rights advocates in prying China open to western values and standards of 
conduct. Even though Bush insisted on separating the issue of trade and human rights 
with regard to this issue, Clinton however, upon having been elected, pledged that 
America’s commitment to freedom could only be demonstrated by linking the MFN 
debate with improvements in the treatment of dissident voices in China. *^  The Clinton 
strategy for extracting political concessions from Beijing was in part only rhetorical.
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because his bellicose tone became more conciliatory after several months into the new 
administration. In terms of the socio-political image created by the MFN debate, the 
conflict in government clearly exemplified the moral ambivalence that American 
politicians suffered from in the aftermath o f  Tiananmen.
The argument offered by the administrations for granting China the measure was 
based primarily on the conjecture that a revocation o f  MFN would lead to economic 
tensions in China, and an abandonment of American ideals. In a 1991 commencement 
ceremony at Yale University, Bush stood firm in his position that a denial o f MFN could 
exacerbate tensions in an already fragile program for economic reform. The president 
added that withholding approval was counterproductive for American interests because it 
thwarted efforts at encouraging privatization and increasing respect for “hiunan rights” in 
China. “The most compelling reason to renew MFN and remain engaged in China,” 
declared Bush, “is not economic, is not strategic, but moral. It is right to export the ideals 
o f freedom and democracy to China.”*® Moreover, in opposition to those who sought to 
deny MFN to China, Bush argued that “[cjritics who attack MFN today act as if  the point 
is to punish China, as if  hurting China’s economy will somehow help the cause o f 
privatization and human rights.” *^  The use o f the measure, therefore, served a dual 
purpose. For one, it allowed for the advancement o f American socio-philosophical ideals 
abroad, and second, it furthered the well being o f  the Chinese populace by promoting the 
interests o f privatization and individual proprietorship.
While Bush steadfastly backed this policy for the remainder o f his second term 
through a policy o f “engagement,” Clinton reassured Americans that he planned a similar 
course o f action. Termed “comprehensive engagement,” the Clinton policy sought an
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expansion of commercial relations with the PRC because China was quickly emerging as 
the next economic powerhouse in East Asia. The image o f  China as “a vital source of 
export revenues and jobs” ** took shape at this time, with the concomitant image o f moral- 
political ambivalence attached to the former image. Officials reiterated claims that 
extending MFN was imperative, if  America wanted to continue a “constructive 
relationship with China now and in the future.” *^  In summary, the lucrative opportunities 
that China trade offered American businesses and average citizens in the form of 
employment became the hallmark of the comprehensive engagement policy, but anxiety 
about the treatment o f  Chinese dissidents and their imprisonment was repeatedly attached 
to this political-economic dialogue.
In the early 1990s, the Tiananmen incident became the rallying cry for American 
human rights advocates within the ranks of government. The sporadic mention of 
communist repression was not uncommon in the circles o f government and the mass 
media prior to 1989, but Tiananmen served as a galvanizing force that cemented the 
opinion among many Americans that China operated outside o f the boundaries of 
universal human rights standards.
Definitionally, the concept o f human rights has become a controversial terms in 
recent years. At the center o f  the debate is the question o f whether a western definition o f 
human rights is apphcable to the Chinese cultural experience, or is the notion of 
universality in the concept an ethnocentric fallacy. From a purely westem-based 
perspective, the apparent nonexistence o f individualism and the historical de-emphasis on 
individual human motivations in China have been points o f contention between China 
and the United States since these civilizations came into contact with one another. In the
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Euro-American tradition, the concept o f the self has served as the point o f origin for
philosophical claims concerning the idea of human universality and cross-cultural
standards of morality.
It would be a misconception, however, to suggest that limited-personalism is not a
venue for the cultivation o f  philosophical and individual morality in Chinese culture. As
William Theodore de Bary has argued, even during the Maoist regime, the Communist
Party appealed to the Confucian tradition o f self-cultivation as a means o f improving the
socio-moral bonds of socialism.^® Unfortunately for the government, the appeals o f party
elite in this admirable endeavor proved unsuccessful, since the political confines of
communism prevented the genuine growth of human virtue on a personal level.
After the tumultuous decade o f the Cultural Revolution and the political chaos o f the
1970s, Jing Lin maintains that a growing number of Chinese students turned to the
western conception o f human rights and freedom, as a means o f locating a sense of
personal identity within the modem world. Disenchanted with the radicalism o f
Marxism-Maoism, these students looked to the west as a guide for constructing the basis
o f civil society in post-Mao China.^* Notwithstanding the desire for the wholesale
incorporation o f western liberalism into China, the intellectual adaptations o f this era
blended communitarian elements o f the Chinese intellectual tradition with western
Liberalism. In effect, the essence o f western individualism and a genuine respect for the
power o f individual human abilities received minimal treatment by these scholars, for the
individual self, as a historically reemerging concept in Chinese culture, has often been
misinterpreted as egotism and selfishness. As Tu Wei-ming explains:
The Enlightenment assertion, implicit in virtually all declarations o f human rights, 
that the individual has inalienable rights, and that individualism as the doctrine of
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protecting the dignity, autonomy, and independence of the private person is a 
hallmark o f  the liberation o f the human spirit, has never been fully appreciated by the 
Chinese intelligentsia. The Confucian idea that selfhood, as a center o f  relationships, 
realizes itself in communal participation has so much dominated the Chinese 
discourse on self and society that individualism is often misunderstood as self- 
centeredness.^^
Therefore, two avenues o f misunderstanding and ambiguity exist in the America-Chinese 
understandings o f human rights. First, conservatives and liberals alike in the United 
States assert that the communist government’s notion of human rights —  emphasis on 
order, community, social stability, and a duty to society and state —  is actually the 
antithesis o f human individuality. Second, the Chinese intelligentsia’s adaptation o f 
certain aspects o f western liberalism is a cross-cultural aberration in the minds o f many, 
because the western scientific definition o f human rights is universally valid in its 
entirety. For these reasons, the post-Tiananmen period witnessed a systematic attempt on 
the part o f the United States to discredit the political program of the CCP as an exercise 
in tyranny and authoritarianism.
This definitional conflict is best exemplified in the Bush administrations comments 
about the self-evident validity o f personal freedom and libertarian values, fri a 1989 
address before the annual meeting o f the World Bank/IMF, Bush clarified this position 
when stating, “[w]e know what works. Freedom works.... We know how to secure a 
more just and prosperous life for man on earth —  through free markets, free speech, free 
elections, and the exercise of free will unhampered by the state.” *^ In this utterance, the 
president not only commented on the importance of national governments in 
guaranteeing individual freedoms as a universal value in itself, he also tied capitalism and 
free-market enterprise into the complex of variables that contribute to human prosperity 
and self-determination. The following year, the administration reaffirmed the stance
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outlined by Bush in the previous year. American judgments o f human rights in China, 
according to State Department personnel, were not culturally determined condemnations 
rooted in cultural traditions and norms. Rather, “universally recognized principles” '^* o f 
human decency and standards o f  morality were at the core o f presidential policies related 
to China. Hence, market forces were viewed as the most effective mechanism for 
opening the PRC to unorthodox ideas, and an image o f China materialized from these 
statements that its political culture violated international norms o f proper behavior.
This cross-cultural perception becomes crystal clear in the perpetual references made 
by government concerning the Tibetan people’s yearning for independence, and the 
alleged atrocities committed by the communists in the remote province. Communist 
authorities, since the promulgation o f Tibet as an autonomous region o f  the PRC in 1951, 
have actively sought the incorporation of ethnic Tibetans into the cultural milieu o f 
greater China. Currently, a process o f steady acculturation characterizes the Han Chinese 
policy toward ethnic Tibetans. During the mid 1980s, the Chinese central government 
enacted a policy o f modernization and cosmopolitanization for the province, by providing 
large government subsidies for companies that invested in Tibet. Aimed at slowly 
incorporating the region into the overall plan for national modernization, the CCP sought 
the development o f the local infrastructure as a means o f “increasing their income and 
reducing their isolation” from the rest o f C h i n a . T h e  nationalistic elements within 
Tibet, particularly the Dalai Lama and patriotic Buddhists, view the communist policy 
not as a gesture of benevolent modernization, but as the systematic eradication o f their 
traditional culture. Hence, nationalists in Tibet resent the presence of the Han as an
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unwanted horde o f foreigners who have little or no regard for the cultural integrity o f the 
Tibetan people.
As a symbol o f international pride and territorial integrity for Beijing, Tibet is a 
crucial area o f contention for communist leaders who seek to dislodge the weight o f 
separatist and nationalistic elements in China. In Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, as Zheng 
Yongnian suggests, a growing ethnic separatist movement has surfaced within the past 
decade. In Xinjiang province alone, some thirty bombing incidents were reported in 
1994. Perpetrated by militant separatists, the terrorists demanded the creation o f an 
independent east Turkestan and autonomy from communist China.^® In similar outbursts 
o f violence, Buddhist monks and Tibetan extremists have periodically attacked 
government and PLA assets, which has resulted in public rioting in Lhasa and swift 
military intervention by Chinese authorities. Taken as a legitimate part o f greater China, 
the central government has stood firm on the independence issue, because the 
maintenance o f  Tibet is now viewed as an illustration o f the central government’s ability 
to wield power and suppress dissent on a national level.
Naturally, the above issue, at least within the American government and media, 
became associated with the Chinese disregard for human rights and ethnic pluralism. In 
1990, a State Department spokesperson declared that “we believe firmly that Tibetans 
should not be prosecuted by Chinese authorities for peacefully expressing their views and 
also for their religious beliefs.”^^  The Clinton administration continued this tradition of 
moral outrage against Beijing when it claimed that reports from the province suggested 
that continued suppression o f  religious freedom and public association were ongoing in 
Tibet. In fact, arbitrary arrests, torture, and criminal conviction without due process
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characterized Beijing’s unofficial policy toward the local populace/* In certain cases, the 
MFN question was juxtaposed with the alleged abuse of Tibetans. Nevertheless, the 
United States government reassured the public that additional privatization and capitalism 
were the solutions in assisting the dire situation o f ethnic dissidents and political 
prisoners.
In the era o f ambivalence, the climactic event that triggered public and government 
opinion in an aggressively anti-Chinese direction was the Taiwan Strait incident. As a 
sufficient example for Americans in affirming the potentially belhgerent motivations o f 
the PRC toward its neighbors, the military exercises and live missile tests conducted by 
the mainland galvanized government and public opinion against China. Before 1995, the 
actual viciousness o f the Chinese Communist Party, other than with regard to the 
Tiananmen crackdown, were addressed only in brief. However, beginning with the 
military exercises undertaken by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the 
Taiwan Strait prior to the presidential elections in Taiwan, American images o f political 
uncertainty and Chinese aggressiveness came to the fore of the policy debate.
The United States wasted no time in presenting Taiwan with military assistance to 
deter a prospective communist invasion. Ambassador Winston Lord, following the 
tactical operations conducted by the PLAN, warned that the region had witnessed a 
momentary period of instability as the Chinese test-fired missiles within just miles o f the 
i s l a n d . T w o  months prior to this statement. President Clinton warned that the United 
States supported the “one China policy,” and it was in the best interest o f the region if  
both parties, namely China and Taiwan, “clearly understood” America’s commitment to 
bilateral peace.^° This stance o f involvement, as Clinton knew all too well, directly
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brought the PRC and the United States Navy into a position o f possible conflict, i f
tensions between the parties flared. As Li Ziaobing has commented, a “duel strategy”
was combined by the late Mao Zedong on the question o f Taiwan that utihzeed diplomacy
and “militancy.”** In the tradition of Mao, the opinions expressed by B eijing  nearly two
decades later followed a similar path; for the CCP applied militant diplom acy toward
Taiwan when the strategy was in its own geo-political interest. The United SStates,
however, rejected the PRC approach as “saber rattling” and as an act o f  crosss-strait
militancy. Thus, Clinton pledged American diplomatic intervention in the diispute, and
adamantly called for a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Secretary o f State WTarren
Christopher echoed this posture in a 1996 press briefing when he declared;
The United States strongly believes that the resolution o f the issues betw-een the PRC 
and Taiwan must be peaceful. We were gravely concerned when China’=s military 
exercises two months ago raised tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Our deploym ent o f 
naval forces to the region was meant to avert any dangerous miscalculations. We are 
encouraged that both sides have now taken steps to reduce tensions.
In all, American fears of Chinese expansionism, notwithstanding the fact that the PRC
considers the resolution of the Taiwan issue a domestic predicament, were coKifirmed by
Beijing’s show o f force in the region.
As the transitional event that sparked American interest about the possibi hty o f
Chinese expansionism in the region, the Taiwan crisis cemented fears in the nninds of
Americans that China might become the successor to the Soviet Union as the mext major
international adversary of the United States. The situation marked the beginning o f a
new era in which American diplomatic and cultural images o f China focused o n  the
notion that China was a rising power in Asia, and a likely threat to international stability
and peace. The image of a positive-negative duality was cast aside after the T'aiwan
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debacle, and Americans increasingly perceived communist China as an Asian adversary 
with hostile intentions toward the international community.
Popular Images o f China: The Era o f Confusion 
The post-Tiananmen assumption, ideas, and stereotypes o f American policy makers 
mirrored the cultural inclinations o f the popular press. In much the same manner as 
policy makers, journalists repeatedly detailed political, economic, and social 
developments in China from a rabidly anti-communist perspective. The once sanguine 
and positive images o f a modernizing nation coming to terms with a market-oriented 
world were replaced with much hamher criticisms o f China’s political-economic 
structure. However, a faith in the politically reconstructive power of commerce and the 
Chinese people’s yearning for freedom were depicted in the press as domestic forces that 
could not be ignored permanently by communist hardliners. Still, the general tone o f 
media coverage was critical o f Chinese human rights standards, regional expansionism, 
and the political unpredictability of the CCP. Although the image o f an open Chinese 
market for American exports filled the pages o f magazines in the former half o f the 
1990s, the previously marginalized concerns of human rights and political belligerence 
moved to the fore o f  media coverage. This genuine ambivalence created a dualistic 
picture o f  China as a land o f economic plenty and a possible menace in the years to come.
In the wake o f the Tiananmen incident, the American press recanted its previously 
held position that the democracy demonstrations had reshaped the political landscape o f 
the country. Because the ideological strength of liberal-democracy and the desire for 
freedom manifested with tremendous popular support in 1989, the press reluctantly clung
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to the idea that although freedom had been contained in the short term, capitalism and 
consumerism were embryonic forces that no totalitarian regime, regardless o f its level o f 
oppressiveness, could effectively stifle. In this regard, media correspondents depicted the 
Chinese populace as a mass o f individuals caught between traditional notions o f  
communitarian dedication and consumerist freedom.
The media endorsed the idea that Chinese industriousness and hard work were better 
suited for capitalist economic systems, that would make more efficient use o f the Chinese 
work ethic. In support o f  this proposal. Time columnist Michael Kramer wrote, “the 
people seem energetic, if  fitful; a fifth of the world’s population in a cage. Good, 
hardworking people who deserve better than the suffocating Communism that limits their 
enterprise.”*^  Also, the existence o f a powerful market culture that cast aside communist 
ideology and central-govemment directives was depicted as the future o f an economically 
maturing nation. Guangdong, one o f China’s most financially prosperous provinces, was 
said to have “[mjore than 2 million residents work for foreign joint ventures, making 
small fortunes by Chinese standards. Evidence o f  Guangdong’s fast-lane corporate 
culture is everywhere at hand. The parking lot at the Aide Electronic Rice Cooker plant 
overflows with Mercedes-Benz cars.”** The article went on to add that state ideology 
was o f little or no importance to these entrepreneurally minded individuals. Apparently, 
the locals were more interested in technical training and “practicality” than the 
ideological dogmatism o f Marxism and Maoism.*'* These report, from a cross-cultural 
perspective, reacted to the legacy of what historian Lucian Pye has termed the “ritualistic 
symbolism” o f Chinese political culture.*® In order to maintain political cohesiveness, a 
principle tradition o f  social order in China has dogmatically affirmed the power o f  the
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central government in manufacturing political unity. Viewed as a symbol o f 
retrogressiveness and political stagnancy, western journalists depicted this tradition in the 
most negative o f terms. Therefore, as the new driving force behind reform and laissez- 
faire capitalism, the culture o f the market was portrayed as transforming a backward land 
into a technologically advanced society.
Another cultural assumption that was fostered by the media at this time was the 
notion o f  Chinese consumerism. Chinese contact with foreign firms and products has 
progressively increased since Deng enacted the “four modernizations” program. Soon 
after the announcement o f the plan, western consumer goods from Europe and the United 
States began flowing into the PRC, as a result of heightened commercial contact between 
China and the west. Within a decade, according to press reports, a consumer culture that 
craved western made merchandise had emerged. A 1994 Newsweek article quickly 
concluded that “[tjhere is no longer any doubt: China cares about its athlete’s foot 
problem. Johnson & Johnson subsidiary made sure of that.”*® Author Steven Strasser 
added that the populace has a fascination with anything foreign, so “Maxwell House 
coffee commercials [gave] China’s tea-drinking proletariat an otherworldly scene of 
elegant Westerners on an Italian terrace.”*^  The source o f marketization and the current 
social revolution, interestingly enough, was not completely o f foreign influence because a 
deep-seated pragmatism was imbedded in the Chinese psyche.
The media image o f China in the last decade of the millennium was o f a nation that 
had been reborn; a populace that was collectively liberating itself firom the socio­
economic limitations o f  socialism/utopianism. This pragmatism was described by the 
Shenyang Toyota parts chairman when stating, “don’t waste your time on theory... if the
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company is making money, then we’re successful.”** In response to this statement, the 
author predicted that chairman Zhao Xiyou “may yet be on his way to becoming China’s 
Henry Ford.”*^  The private sector was not the only influential group in society that was 
spearheading change. Many high-level officials within the communist hierarchy were 
characterized as advocates o f  market reform and privatization. The top families in the 
communist network were already heavily involved in firee-market investment, and they 
had the potential o f  leading the country in a commercially oriented direction. In 
combination with pragmatic leaders fi"om the coastal provinces, they “represented the 
most powerful emerging Chinese faction: those who want to go full speed ahead... 
without any rules or regulations to limit the greed, power, and connections of the 
insiders.”'*® In essence, a fundamentally ingrained pragmatism or culture of practicality 
presented China with a vision o f  fireedom and prosperity for the future.
Not entirely absent fi*om this picture was the enormous benefit that the Chinese 
marketplace offered for American corporate interests. The exaltation o f the China 
market was not a new inter-cultural phenomena bom in this period. Historian David L. 
Anderson has noted that as far back as the late nineteenth century, American diplomats 
and merchants fantasized about the prospects of opening up China to the outside world.'** 
In furthering the interest o f  American commerce. Presidents Reagan and Bush were 
committed to a prosperous bilateral trade relationship with China. The expected downfall 
or steady collapse o f  communism, however, did not manifest in midst o f the Tiananmen 
demonstrations. Nevertheless, pohcy makers haphazardly clung to their original thesis 
that commerciahzation would eventually bring about the destruction o f authoritarianism. 
In conjunction with the American economy, press reports tied the prospective growth of
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the domestic economy with the fortunes that could be amassed from accessing a nation of
1.2 billion consumers. “The government’s call [for communications technology] has
been answered by U.S. and foreign giants Uke Alcatel, AT&T, Ericsson, Motorola... all
hooked by a seemingly boundless market o f 1.2 billion Chinese.”^^
The juxtaposition o f  human rights with commerce was another key feature o f many
articles that addressed bilateral economic relations. An article o f brief length in Time
succinctly summarized the administration’s policy on this issue by stating, “the
question... is not whether the U.S. should pressure Beijing to improve its human rights
record. The question is how best to do it while ensuring that America gets a piece o f the
action in the world’s fastest growing economy. The two interests seem antithetical, but
they are not.”^^  Other than the abihty for foreign companies to tap into a virgin market,
the inherent paradox o f bourgeoning capitahsm in an officially communist country was
commented on by media personnel as well. When the Soviet system crumbled under the
pressure o f financial stagnation and internal political chaos, both the political and the
economic structures o f Russian Federation were reconfigured along liberal-democratic
lines of operation. The fact that state communism had survived the outpouring of
criticism in Tiananmen baffled many journalists, so an actual understanding o f how
Chinese market-socialism fimctioned was difficult for many to comprehend. The
apparent ambiguity present within the nature o f the new economic system is observable
in John Rothchild’s article on this question:
As you no doubt have heard, China is the world’s biggest emerging market: 1.2 
billion potential consumers for cars, TV sets, patio furniture, all the stuff w e’ve 
already got. This is the era o f global investing, it is said, and the sophisticated 
investor can’t afford to ignore China, an exciting economy with a great future, 
because the most ardent capitahsts you’ll ever meet are the Chinese communists."^
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In much the same fashion as policy makers, the popular press concentrated extensively on 
prying open the Chinese market to foreign access and material consumption. But just as 
administrators were quick to realize that large-scale reform provided not only for foreign 
investment but domestic financial prosperity as well, the media also began to view the 
boom in the Chinese economy with a certain degree o f hesitancy.
Politically, the Chinese military demonstrated its capacity for social repression in 
1989. Even though privatization o f state enterprises proceeded at a steady pace in the 
years following the Tiananmen crackdown, American investors, public officials, and 
media personnel feared that Chinese marketization would result in the creation o f an East 
Asian economic giant with malevolent intentions. During the 1980s, Japan held the 
preeminent position as the economic success story o f East Asia. By the early years o f the 
next decade, a Time article speculated that “relations between China and the U.S. will 
shape the world in the 21^ century.”"*^ Therefore, the media caught onto the notion that 
China, not Japan, was becoming the rising economic power in the East, an image echoed 
by journalist Joe Klein in an article entitled “Why China Does It Better.”"*^ According to 
Klein’s observation, the absence of a strong control mechanism, namely the state, 
allowed Chinese business the requisite freedom for healthy innovation and growth. In 
addition, this relative autonomy firom control mechanisms contributed to the hitherto 
unexpected increase in China’s gross national product.
Klein did not neglect to mention the idea that capitalism and the merchant ethic ran 
through the cultural heritage o f the Chinese. In citing the impressions o f one Japanese 
diplomat who commented upon the phenomena, the official concluded that the “Chinese 
are a nation o f merchants.”"^  ^ This fear of Chinese economic expansionism and its
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possible long-term ramifications fueled a sense o f unease in the voice of the diplomat, 
who predicted that the “Chinese brand o f commerce eventually could overwhelm the 
more controlled Japanese model.”"^* A significantly negative aspect o f this model o f 
commerce was its lack o f  governmental oversight, since Beijing retained only minimal 
economic control over the actions and pohtical/economic decisions of local entrepreneurs 
and business moguls. Relaxation of central planning provided for expeditious p l a n n i n g  
and opportunities at the village and township levels, but the downsizing of the state sector 
left local official-merchants out of the reach o f  government authorities. British China 
scholar Gerald Segal, in a 1994 Newsweek article sub-titled “The Central Government is 
Losing Control,”"^  ^argued that Beijing’s insistence that it maintain control over provincial 
enterprise, politics, and planning was simply a façade, because provincial official- 
merchants operated autonomously; outside o f central planning directives.
Another set o f  images that clearly dovetails the previous section concerning the 
economic prowess o f China is the notion that China sought to join the international 
commercial/political community under its own terms or political guidelines —  that is, a 
rogue nation among more responsible nations. Mortimer Zuckerman, in commenting 
upon the incremental pace at which reform in China is moving, described the nature o f 
Chinese modernization as “pragmatic” and “ad hoc” capitalism.^° After having received 
advice firom American economists and political tacticians, in Zuckerman’s view, China 
opted for an unorthodox approach to restructuring its antiquated system o f socialism.
With regard to the trajectory o f Chinese economic policy, Zuckerman wrote “China has 
listened but is going its own way... groping across the river by feeling the stones.” *^ 
Because Americans had encountered a nation where resource facihtation/allocation and
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investment decisions were simultaneously socialist and capitalist, a general sense o f  
unease characterized the tone o f  many press reports at this time. The socialist market 
economy o f China, in the opinion o f Steven Butler, was described cynically by China’s 
East Asian neighbors as a “Chinese brand o f swashbuckling capitalism.”^^  American 
businesses and investors world-wide expected that a culture o ffair trade and the rule o f  
law would eventually develop in China, so the clear absence o f these regulatory forces 
fostered a sense o f hesitancy about foreign involvement in the Chinese domestic 
economy.
In relation to their anachronistic system o f central economic planning, the Chinese 
mode of commercial exchange became an additional focal point for those journalists who 
sought to unmask the chaos behind comprehensive socio-economic reform. In many 
instances, the idea that China circumvented international rules o f  commerce flooded the 
pages o f the popular press, in addition to the assertion that a cunning market culture had 
evolved in China; a culture that ignored the legal rights o f foreign and domestic investors. 
Similar to allegations o f  Chinese thievery and underhandedness that characterized 
American images o f Chinese “coolie” laborers a century ago, image formulators 
propagated the thesis that although China was in the midst of a massive economic 
overhaul (deregulation), significant impediments thwarted comprehensive reform in the 
areas o f  commercial law, equal access to joint-ventures, and most importantly intellectual 
property rights. Newsweek sited the complaints o f one foreign businessman in 1995 who 
admitted that enormous hurdles prevented optimum levels o f capital accumulation, since 
92 percent o f computer software in China was o f pirated origin.^^ Similar complaints 
were voiced about the sale o f foreign music and movies. Russell Watson summed up the
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situation aptly when stating, “[ejveryone does it, but no one does it like the Chinese, who 
have turned illegal copying into a $1 billion-a-year racket. They have flooded their own 
cities and world markets with ripoffs o f American-music CDs.” "^* Other cases o f patent 
theft and illegal duphcation o f non-Chinese products stressed the perplexing idea that the 
vast majority o f  Chinese simply accepted bootlegging as a natural component o f  market 
freedom. With regard to modified sport utility vehicles that ran under the name o f Jeep 
Cherokee but were generic replicas, the Chrysler Company president admitted how 
baffled he was that “the Chinese see nothing wrong with this.”^^  In all, the investor’s 
paradise that Americans lauded in one breath, was condemned as a commercially unsafe 
and treacherous environment in another. China had evolved, in the assessment o f the 
press, into an economically anarchic nightmare in which multinational corporations were 
prone to unstable market forces.
For most westerners, the military might unleashed upon the democracy 
demonstrators in 1989 was the work o f a political regime that utterly disregarded 
universal standards o f human rights. State Department documents from this period 
confirm this position, for America’s policy makers repeatedly expressed concern for the 
human rights “record” o f China. Based on western and American ideological precepts 
proclaiming the universality o f democracy and representative government, media 
personnel took a stance o f firmness on this issue. More than any other set of images 
present within press articles, the notion o f tyranny and political repression formed the 
core o f popular attitudes toward Chinese human rights. In brief, the catalyst for the 
creation o f this series of cross-cultural assumptions was the suppression of political 
dissent by the Chinese government. Rather than presenting these images in mass, image
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formulators broke down the most serious violations o f human decency into four distinct 
categories: MFN and cheap labor, the status of women in contemporary China, and the 
attempt on the part o f Beijing to stifle ethnic nationalism in Tibet.
The United States Congress, since 1989, has viewed the annual renewal of Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) for China as the primary tool in Washington’s arsenal for 
extracting concessions on issues pertaining to human rights. In rhetorically stressing the 
violent character o f the CCP and the PLA, administrators and elements within the 
American media linked these topics together and effectively created an image that 
political and social rights in modem China were on America’s bilateral agenda with the 
PRC. In a 1990 column discussing the political position o f the Bush administration and 
MFN, Newsweek reported the president as having warned, “I don’t want to send a signal 
that we are happy [with the Chinese] human rights r e c o r d . I n  relation to the renewal 
o f MFN and the corporate use o f Chinese low-cost labor in China, a picture of Chinese 
textile and consumer goods manufacturing materialized, in which inexpensive exports 
were said to have inundated the international market. Once again, the Chinese were 
depicted as a cunning breed o f  businessmen who cast aside even the most basic protocols 
o f employer-labor relations; namely a neglect for decent wages. Journalist Tom Post 
warned that as China “dumped” products “made by prisoners” into the global 
marketplace, American companies simultaneously suffered exclusion from certain 
markets in which the Chinese repeatedly underbid American based companies.^^ If that 
were not enough, even the historically revered employees of state-owned firms were 
forced to work under less than acceptable conditions of work. These dreadful labor 
standards included virtually no time off and company fines for illness, to name but a
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few.^ ® One engineer who worked for a joint-venture enterprise was quoted ais having 
admitted, “people are being worked beyond reasonable limits and than docked if  they 
don’t.”^^  The MFN question tied in wonderfully with these cross-cultural assessments, as 
evidenced by Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen’s succinct declaration regarciing the 
renewal o f MFN. Bentsen claimed that America detested the use o f prison labor, and 
would only grant MFN on the condition that “overall, significant progress” w/as made in 
the area of human rights.*^ ® As the preeminent weapon for the United States Ln pursuing 
its ideological disposition for establishing social-democracy and capitalism i o  China,
MFN and human rights took center-stage in the era o f American ambivalences toward the 
PRC.
The status o f women, notwithstanding the assertion o f the CCP that attemtion to 
women’s issues was a primary concern for the party, became a point o f intere?st for 
American joumahsts during Hilary Clinton’s visit to China in mid-1995. In oane notable 
instance, Susan Lawrence dismissed the Maoist slogan that “women hold up taalf the 
sky” *^ as simply a pseudo-communist myth. The economic standing o f  many Chinese 
had been raised with the ascent o f Deng Xiaoping and the introduction o f  the rfour 
modernizations, but workplace rights for women and equal opportunity emplo»yment, 
according to Lawrance, were “often cast aside” in an effort to maximize p ro fit at the 
expense o f gender equality .E ffectively , corporate profits were more im portant within 
the sociahst market system than the equality o f the sexes. The First Lady, in am effort to 
speak out on behalf o f  the politically voiceless, echoed many of the above criticism s 
during her trip to China for the Fourth World Conference on Women. One report 
predicted that if Beijing attempted to suppress these critical voices during the conference.
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the government “may end up creating its own worst nightmare: a big group o f  angry 
feminists with some particular gripes about C h i n a . T h r o u g h  this manner o f  reporting, 
Americans moved toward a negative understanding o f gender and social conditions 
within contemporary China.
Independent reports o f human rights abuses from organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch contributed to the infusion o f the popular image that government brutality 
was rampant in state-run orphanages. The concomitant assumption that the national one- 
child policy breached the right o f individuals in deciding parental issues added a distinct 
tone o f negativity to the already tarnished image o f the CCP as a monolithic, totaUtarian 
entity. In detailing the living conditions within these orphanages, Newsweek described 
the daily standard o f  living for the children as “horrific,” because medical and 
administrative neglect contributed to a high mortality rate within these institutions.^ 
Carroll Bogert went on to conclude that for a child, life within these compounds was 
comparable to residing in “virtual death camps.”^^  When describing the government’s 
one-child policy and family planning, the press leveled charges o f obsessive cruelty and 
control at the Communist Party. Their draconian method o f maintaming a stable 
population level was said to conflict with the universal rights o f humans in deciding the 
fate o f their lives. Further depictions o f the system presented the regime as an entity that 
involved itself in the most personal affairs of citizens. “Controlling the population,” in 
Bogert’s view, “is the crucial obsession of the Chinese authorities... the central core 
policy that radiates out in all d i r e c t i o n s . W i t h  regard to government interference in 
public affairs, Hilary Clinton, at the 1995 women’s conference was quoted as saying:
It is a violation o f human rights when women are denied the right to plan their own
families, and that includes being forced to have abortions or being sterilized against
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their w ill... let me be clear... freedom means the right o f people to assemble, 
organize and debate openly. It means respecting the views o f those who may 
disagree with the views of their governments.^^
An intricate component of American social philosophy is the belief in individual 
self-determination and a respect and love for human diversity. Linked to the idea that 
individual development o f cultural characteristics and modes o f behavior should be 
guaranteed through representative government, American individualism lends credence 
to many ethnic separatist movements around the world. Backed by numerous 
entertainment figures from the Hollywood film industry and affiliated NGOs and human 
rights groups, the Tibetan independence movement gained a massive following in the 
wake o f the Tiananmen crackdown. Presented as the bastion o f ethnic self-determination 
in Asia, the Tibetan independence movement was popularized by the press during the 
period o f ambivalence.
As the public showpiece o f the Tibetan separatist movement, the Dalai Lama has 
taken advantage o f  pro-Tibetan sentiments outside o f China. Depicted as the savior o f 
ethnic self-determination in the west, the Dalai Lama has become a symbol of ethno­
religious freedom for the American press. Time ran a short article in December o f  1995 
in which the Tibetan leader reiterated his unyielding position toward Beijing. “Unless we 
guard our own country,” he declared, “it will now happen that the Dalai and Panchen 
Lamas, the Father and the Son, and all the revered holders o f the Faith, will disappear and 
become nameless.” *^ Even though Beijing regarded Tibet as historically a part o f greater 
China, American sentiments leaned heavily toward the Tibetan position that the province 
was an independent tributary of China. Other depictions o f Chinese political domination 
in the remote province characterized the current policy o f the government as “cultural
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genocide.”*^  ^ In sum, the combined depiction of Tibetan suppression, the low status o f 
women, and the brutal condition o f government orphanages cemented an image of 
communist brutality within the American psyche.
Most notably, the pivotal event that became the catalyst in heightening American 
fears o f Chinese expansionism was the PRCs show of military force near the Taiwanese 
coast in mid-1995. The presentation o f this potential political crisis in the American 
press followed a pattern o f  biased anti-Chinese coverage so common to the period under 
scrutiny. Taiwan, politically and economically, has maintained a congenial relationship 
with the United States for more than two decades, but Beijing’s interaction with the 
Taipei government has not fared so well. As noted before, American observers in media 
and government, left with a sense o f political uncertainty after Tiananmen, were 
searching for tangible vahdation of their assertion that China was in the process of 
evolving into an aggressive and malevolent power. Observers, realizing that the current 
conflict was a continuation o f the historical conflict between the communist and 
nationalists, seized upon the 1995 military exercises as credible proof of China’s regional 
political misconduct. Because Taiwan functioned under democratic principles and a free- 
market economic system, Americans felt a certain bond of loyalty to the ideals of 
freedom represented by Taiwan. Hence, when Beijing announced its first round of 
routine exercises in the strait, American reports presented the scenario more as an act o f 
international aggression, than an internal political dispute; the position held even today 
bythePRC.^°
Although passive reference was made to the Chinese claim that the island was a 
“renegade province,” virtually every article written at this time lauded the economic
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success o f Taiwan and its adherence to western principles o f  representative government 
and human freedom. A  Newsweek article from February o f 1996 summed up the 
American perspective succinctly. [China] regards Taiwan,” Tom Post cynically wrote, 
“as a miscreant province — a free-market, democratic stepchild as odds with its 
Confucian, socialist parent -  and its president a crypto-separatist.”^^  The reason offered 
by journalists for the timing o f  these military maneuvers ranged from an outright show of 
force, to an internal political diversion. According to columnist Greg May, domestic 
dissenters, not unlike the students that organized the Tiananmen demonstrations, were 
becoming more and more difficult for mainland authorities to co-opt and control. Thus, 
in the tradition o f the Tiananmen crackdown, the PLAN’S show o f force served as an 
immediate deterrent against democratic elements in Taiwan and the mainland. At length. 
May writes:
In fact, while Taiwan keeps its cool, China is the side that looks truly fiightened. 
Some observers say Beijing’s nightmare goes far beyond the specter of Taiwanese 
separatism. The real fear, they say, is the steadily rising tide o f democracy-not only 
in Taiwan and Hong Kong but on the mainland as well. And at least some o f that 
fear is grounded in fact. China’s galloping prosperity is raising people’s aspirations 
and expectations. Growing numbers o f Chinese are realizing for the first time that 
individual liberties are no less precious than refrigerators and television sets. That’s 
one reason the Beijing government has felt compelled to go on waging its war 
against public dissent..
As the issue o f  anti-democratic suppression filtered into press reports around this time,
naturally, other questions concerning China’s military capabilities moved to the fore o f
foreign policy inquiries and debates.
In the greater scheme o f  cross-cultural image periodization, the Taiwan Strait crisis
galvanized American fears o f Chinese expansionism and military intimidation. With a
critical eye focused upon the miUtary and nuclear capabilities o f  China, the American
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government, during the second Clinton administration, fabricated the scenario that China 
was actively involved in upgrading its nuclear arsenal, as a means o f  eventually 
challenging America’s military hegemony in East Asia. Previous fears about the nature 
o f post-Cold War politics in China, especially the anxiety witnessed in the era o f 
uncertainty, matured in a radically negative direction following the Taiwan incident. As 
the transitional point that brought an end to the post-Tiananmen period, the Taiwan crisis 
intensified domestic anxiety and fostered the myth that China had taken the place of the 
Soviet Union as the geo-political adversary o f the United States. The fi-agility of the 
period’s optimism, sanguine expectations, and hopefulness had been effectively 
undermined by the Chinese military’s show o f force toward the Taiwanese government.
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CHAPTER 5
TAINTED IMAGES: ADVERSARIAL CHINA?
The three year period ending the twentieth century witnessed a reemergence of 
hostile American attitudes toward China. Sparked by the threat o f a Chinese invasion of 
Taiwan and its concomitant military modernization, American government officials and 
media personnel uncritically concluded that a continuation of Cold War rivalries was 
imminent. Accordingly, American viewers o f the situation emphasized the expansion of 
Chinese military power in East Asia, and the potentially destabilizing force that such a 
development might signify for the Pacific Rim. In addition, these adjustments in 
remedying their outdated/antiquated technology were characterized by many Americans 
as a program o f dehberate militarization to counter American military hegemony in East 
Asia. Allegations o f suspected espionage on the part of the Chinese government surfaced 
during this era, in conjunction with the assumption that China was on the verge o f 
upgrading its nuclear arsenal; a plan that ran counter to the international movement for a 
steady reduction o f nuclear weaponry in developed countries.
Since the path that China had taken in the 1990s in moving toward a market 
economy was viewed with contempt, given that the regime formulated a political- 
economic structure that incorporated elements o f  capitalism and socialism into its design. 
Thus, an image o f China as a rising communist giant captured the American psyche.
80
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America, however, steadfastly maintained that the incorporation o f China into the global 
socio-economic milieu was possible and necessary for the future o f  the PRC. As such, 
engagement with international forces and institutions, access to foreign ideas, and the 
proliferation o f  free-markets through privatization were the tools by which this transition 
was to take place. Thus, the ultimate transformation o f American social philosophy into 
a “global standard o f philosophical operation” developed simultaneously along with these 
cultural images.
In the former portion o f the decade, governmental and popular appeals to American 
ideals of moral, economic, and political conduct, dominated cross-cultural debates 
regarding the contemporary political evolution of China. In the latter part of the decade, 
however, the paradigm o f American ideological superiority shifted to a discussion of the 
same under the rubric o f global universality. At least rhetorically, the American ideal o f 
liberal-democracy had become the gauge by which developing countries and their 
structures of government were evaluated.
Images and Foreign Policv: Menacing China 
In his book entitled The Third World Century. Charles Stewart Goodwin argues that 
as civilizations have ascended and descended in political superiority throughout history, 
noticeable signs o f transition have marked these phases o f rise and decline. Most 
civilizations that are experiencing a process of perpetual decline, Goodwin maintains, 
exhibit tendencies toward the maximization of human freedom and individual liberty. On 
the other hand, civilizations that are increasing in political influence and international 
stature, for the most part, maintain relatively authoritarian systems o f government while
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allowing for only minimal to moderate expressions o f  individuality and deviations from 
accepted social norm s/ Generally speaking, Goodwin’s assertions are applicable to 
recent developments in Asia, but more specifically to the sphere o f  Chinese economics 
and politics. Given that China maintains an authoritarian system o f  government, an 
increased level o f attention has been given to the possibility that China is becoming the 
latest in a series o f international superpowers. Furthermore, Goodwin’s conjecture has 
gained notoriety and popularity among the ranks of American journalists since the anti­
communist bias o f many media personnel compels them to accept apocalyptic and often 
paranoid suggestions about the future of Chinese political evolution.
With regard to the upsurge o f  nationahsm in contemporary China, scholars such as 
Yongnian Zheng point to a number of contributing factors that have led to the growth of 
patriotic expressions o f  behavior in the post-Tiananmen era. The apparent “crisis o f faith 
in Marxism and Maoism,” the delegitimization of popular support for the CCP after 
Tiananmen, and the absence o f the Soviet Union from the geo-political scene, are some 
o f the more pertinent variables that have contributed to the rebirth o f  nationalism in 
China.^ A natural intellectual inclination on the part o f many scholars to equate these 
socio-political changes with Chinese expansionism has fostered an uncritical 
understanding in circles o f  government and the popular press that China has taken the 
place o f the Soviet Union as America’s international political.adversary. From a more 
critical perspective, as Zheng has observed, the Chinese government has remained 
“rational” in its reaction to popular outbursts o f nationalism and emotional patriotism.^ 
Therefore, heightened fears o f  nationalism in China derived from a plethora o f internal 
political problems. In many ways, the notion that the government sponsored the upsurge
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in domestic nationalism was unfounded. Nevertheless, the press seized the issue o f
outward power projection and hastily assumed that American hegemony and regional
stability in East Asia were effectively threatened by China’s military modernization and
burgeoning domestic production.
With regard to America’s China policy, the most pressing concern that government
analysts encountered in the wake o f the Taiwan debacle was not necessarily military in
nature, but rather strategic. The question was posed: In a global economic system, how
can a nation configure a long-term, strategic program for dealing with a potential enemy?
Although this question will be addressed in a later section, president Clinton echoed the
fears o f  many Americans in a statement presented before The Institute For Peace. By
validating the popular notion that China was a security threat in the East Asian region
during his speech, Clinton passively affirmed the image that the PRC behaved in a
belligerent manner toward its neighbors. At length, Clinton stated:
More recently, many Americans have looked to China to see either the world’s next 
great capitalist tiger and an enormous motherlode o f economic opportunity for 
American and their workers, or the world’s last great communist dragon and next 
great threat to fireedom and security. For a long time, it seems to me, we have argued 
about China with competing caricatures. Is this a country to be engaged, or isolated? 
Is this a country beyond our power to influence, or a country that is ours to gain and 
ours to lose? Now we hear that China is a country to be feared. A growing number 
o f people say that it is the next threat to our security and our well-being. What about 
this argument? Well, those who say it point out, factually, that if  China’s economy 
continues to grow on its present trajectory, it will be the world’s largest in the next 
century. They argue, correctly, that the Chinese government often defines its 
interests in ways sharply divergent firom ours. They are concerned, rightly, by 
Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan and at others. From this they conclude that China 
is, or will be, our enemy."^
As an adequate solution required for the handling of a potential adversary, Clinton 
tacitly advocated a policy o f strategic engagement. Unfortunately for the administration, 
allegations of Chinese espionage surfaced immediately after the Taiwan crisis unfolded.
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Numerous government sources cited the fact that over the past decade, China has taken 
steps toward mihtary modernization and technological restructuring. A 1997 State 
Department Bulletin asserted that “the Chinese mihtary is trying to transform itself from 
a land-based power, centered on a vast ground force, to a smaller, mobile, high-tech 
military, but has a long way to go.”  ^ Supported by conservative elements within 
American academia, similar research depicted China as a nation that sought the effective 
technological transformation o f its land, air, and sea based forces. In essence, these 
reports claimed that China was in the process o f upgrading its weapons systems in order 
to meet twenty-first century demands o f operation.
The most controversial o f these allegations pointed to the possibility that sensitive 
nuclear information had been compromised through a program o f Chinese espionage that 
spanned nearly two decades. The most pubhcly debated aspect to this scenario was the 
publication o f the Cox Report, drafted by a select committee of the U.S. House o f 
Representatives. In the final presentation o f  the document, the summationary overview 
determined that “the People’s Republic o f China... has stolen design information on the 
United States’ most advanced thermonuclear weapons.”  ^ Moreover, the authors o f  the 
report admitted that the penetration achieved through covert methods resulted in an 
extensive breach of national security, which, to the surprise of many, was an operation 
that “almost certainly continues today.”  ^ According to intelligence sources documented 
by the committee, the stolen information was acquired by the Chinese in an effort to 
modernize their intercontinental balhstic missile program.®
Fearing congressional reprisal from both Democrats and Republicans, Clinton 
countered the findings o f the report by maintaining that American military security was
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of the highest caliber, because he had personally increased the counterintelligience budget 
o f the Energy Department “by 15-fold since 1995.”  ^ Therefore, the popular assertion that 
national security had been breached via Chinese covert operations emerged as; an 
important assumption of pubhc policy during the period under consideration. Not only 
had China become a threat to Taiwanese security as discussed in the latter chaipter, it also 
affected the ability o f  the United States to maintain an adequate level o f militaary security. 
The question that arose in the ranks of government as a result of the Cox Report focused 
on the steps that were needed to ensure that China modernize along a path thatt was 
acceptable to the security requirements of the international community. Even in the 
midst o f these negative images, the administration foimd hope for the possibility of stable 
relations.
In his detailed reanalysis o f American historiographical conceptions o f th e  Soviet 
Union during the Cold War, Stephen F. Cohen has observed that for the duration of the 
entire experience, the Untied States interpreted the industrial, military, and eco*nomic 
achievements o f the communist block as the “antithesis o f real progress.” °^ Thirough the 
publication o f his pathbreakmg work entitled Rethinking the Soviet Experience. Cohen 
sought to redirect the efforts of conservative historians in an analytical direction that 
critiqued the Soviet experiment on its own terms. In a similar vein, even though strides 
toward this end have been achieved in the realm o f Chinese studies, the graduai erosion 
of anti-Maoism in American Chinese studies has not translated into popular poTitics and 
the culture at large. The transformation of the Chinese industrial complex in time last two 
decades, since it still functions under the supervision o f  a communist regime, h.as been 
viewed by government and press officials as quasi- or pseudo-progressive. Hemce, as
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allegations o f Chinese espionage flooded the media in the two remaining years o f the 
decade, pohcy makers assumed that its secretive, confining political system was the cause 
o f  current international tensions.
For most o f the pervious decade, oddly enough. Republican and Democratic 
administrations clung to the sanguine idea that in opening China up to American liberal- 
democratic ideas o f firee trade, press, and association, its incorporation into the 
international community could be undertaken on peaceful terms. However, in the period 
possible confrontation which began in 1997 as a result o f  the Taiwan strait incident, the 
nature o f the ideological rhetoric pertaining to Liberal-democracy changed dramatically. 
The source of genuine progress before this time was said to have originated firom the 
libertarian tradition o f the United States and the European Enhghtenment. Interestingly 
enough, the content o f the socio-philosophical rhetoric in the period following the 
Taiwan crisis era was left unaltered, but the standards o f national conduct for 
recognizable reform were no longer interpreted as western in origin. Instead, standards 
o f acceptable international conduct were regionally reformulated and presented under the 
rubric o f  globalism. The nature o f  the liberalization and reform debate, therefore, shifted 
focus to a liberal-democratic system that was acceptable to capitalist nations world-wide. 
Rather than culturally bound concepts o f government with limited applicabiUty, the 
content o f  ideological policy was said to have received international acceptance and 
applicability.
Before continuing with the government’s presentation o f this philosophical 
reformulation, it is important to attain an adequate understanding o f  how the process o f 
globalization operates. From a sociological perspective, in recent years, a new sub-
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discipline o f  studies related to globalization has been established. In his masterful 
inquiry o f various theoretical aspects o f the emerging global environment, German 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman argues that the movement o f capital across the national 
borders has created an economic motivation for the increased interaction o f national 
capital and c u l t u r e s . T h e  new capitaUst, in Bauman’s view, requires open access to 
markets on a global basis, so the global network of cross-cultural interaction and 
economics is most accurately understood as a process o f released spatial delimitation. 
Many global analysts have discounted the importance of this phenomena, but as a vital 
feature o f the global marketplace, localization and particularization o f cultural ideas, 
values, and habits o f mind are being replaced (or augmented) by the expansion of market- 
driven values and cultural norms. As Francis Fukuyama has persuasively suggested, 
humanity is in the midst o f an international trend that posits liberal-democracy and free 
enterprise as the most useful and sought after forms o f political economy. In place of 
the totalitarian systems o f the twentieth century, humanity has determined —  through the 
trials o f the Cold W ar— that representative government and the individual worth o f the 
human being is best served by a political structure founded on western principles o f 
freedom and liberty.
Echoes o f this newly formulated perspective marked the thematic tone of 
government policy following the Taiwan incident. Rather than appeals to the infallibility 
o f  American values, policy makers advocated the cultural-economic intemationahzation 
o f  China. In their view, the most effective way o f dealing with the possibility o f Chinese 
militarization and regional belligerence was by continuing the pohcy o f comprehensive 
engagement. Hence, the method o f bilateral interchange advanced by the Clinton
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administration in a 1997 fact sheet on U.S.-China relations was that of global interaction. 
‘Tirst,” the document read, “the United States seeks to fully integrate China into the 
global, market-based economic and trading system. China’s participation in the global 
economy wiU nurture the process of economic reform and increase China’s stake in the 
stability and prosperity o f East Asia.” '^
As far as human rights were concerned, the administration stated that gradual cross- 
cultural contact with global standards o f ethics had improved the lives of countless 
Chinese minorities, and had placed the trajectory o f national progress on the road to 
actual reform. Although the 1997 factsheet on Chinese human rights issues carefully 
avoided stating that the magnitude of human rights reforms in China were impressive, it 
nevertheless summarized some of the gains that bilateral engagement had created for the 
Chinese populace.
With respect to the above findings, the State Department avoided any mention of 
western value judgments. As far as standards of conduct were concerned, China had 
progressed because its antiquated system of government and cultural traditions had been 
exposed to “outside” (global) patterns of thought. The writers o f the document concluded 
that Clinton’s engagement pohcy had improved the fives of a significant portion o f the 
population:
Exposure to the outside world, exchange o f  goods, ideas, and people, has brought 
increased openness, social mobility and personal liberties, including greater fireedom 
of movement, greater choice of employment, schooling, and housing opportunities, 
and improved access to information.., Over time, citizen-to-citizen contacts through 
media, internet and travel expose Chinese people to international standards and 
values and will continue to loosen rigid, authoritarian structures."*
Finally, government sources augmented the above position o f international cultural
assimilation with an economic determinant. Cultural influences firom the outside world
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were pertinent elements in freeing China from the stagnancy o f communism, but deeper 
reform for the nation demanded more than the diffusion o f democratic ideas into the 
complex of variables that foster political-economic change. In the Clinton 
administration’s view, the integration o f marketization under international standards o f 
commercial behavior was a requisite for long-term success. Progress could only take 
place if  China was economically drawn into the commercial network o f the global 
market. By way o f  entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), not only would the 
requirements o f membership in such an organization propel the Chinese “toward 
acceptance of the rule o f  law”* ^  and financial accountability, it would also decrease the 
prospects o f China becoming an “isolated and unpredictable” * ^  adversary.
In sum, pohcy makers, following the Taiwan incident and the pubhcation of 
subsequent reports that perpetuated the atmosphere o f paranoia created by the initial 
cross-strait situation, hastily concluded that China was, in fact, involved in a program o f 
wholesale mihtary modernization. In digesting these political developments, government 
officials looked to the international system of commerce as the means by which this 
supposed military/economic expansionism might be derailed.
Cultural Images o f a New Cold War?
Cross-cultural perceptions o f  China during this period evolved along similar lines as 
America’s foreign pohcy initiatives. Given that the Soviet Union collapsed in the wake 
o f its own internal pohtical and economic contradictions but China had not, joumahsts 
steadily assumed that the Chinese communists had tentatively averted the same fate by 
accommodating the commercial market through limited privatization. In the greater
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scope o f national development, China was, nevertheless, under the control of a brutal 
regime that was willing to jeopardize regional stability for nationahstic purposes. In 
effect, China materialized as the post-Cold War enemy o f America in East Asia; a nation 
with political intentions that diametrically opposed those o f the United States.
Much o f the popular hype that swept the journalistic community around this time 
influenced the analytical perspectives o f many figures in the American literary 
community. One author who was deeply affected by the adversarial school o f thought in 
the latter half o f  the decade was journalist/author Richard Bernstein. Bernstein began his 
professional career as a joumahst for Time magazine in 1973, and later went on to 
publish three books on topics related to cultural issues. When Bernstein’s latest book 
entered the market in 1997, the fears o f  American anti-communists and paranoid 
journalists were affirmed by the primary thesis o f the text. The author, in a show o f 
uncritical analysis based on unfounded hypothetical assertions, predicted that China and 
the United States were on a catastrophic course for eventual military conflict. In citing 
the decade-long diplomatic tension that characterized bilateral relations and China’s 
military modernization, Bernstein concluded that in the long run, this manner of 
diplomacy was unstable and hence unmanageable, so a “looming conflict” between the 
two powers was virtually inevitable.*^ As the author described the situation in the first 
sentence o f the introduction, “The People’s Republic o f China, the world’s most 
populous country, and the United States, its most powerful, have become global rivals, 
countries whose relations are tense, whose interests conflict, and who face tougher, more 
dangerous times ahead.”*® With predictions such as this inciting fear within the
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American community o f journalists, fiirther manifestations o f malevolent images 
progressively emerged in press reports that dealt with China.
The most unsettling of the images crafted by the media was the notion that if the 
power o f the middle kingdom increases, the United States is more likely to enter into a 
conflictual relationship with the PRC. In echoing Bernstein’s conjecture, William 
Holstein stated that in the ranks o f government, “[t]he underlying idea has been that as 
China’s power inevitably grew, economic and political interaction would be the most 
promising way to avoid showdowns or the emergence o f a new cold war.” ’^  The author 
went on to add that containment o f this colossal nation was out o f  the question, because 
its economic influence in the world “is already so profound.” ®^ Thus, from a strategic 
perspective, the growing role o f China in the twenty-first century required intensive 
planning, since China appeared as though it was willing to use force as a means of 
achieving its political objectives.
The second most controversial dilemma that entered the media coverage o f  U.S.- 
China relations was the allegation that China had acquired missile technology from an 
American satellite and communications firm. The Senate Intelligence Committee 
investigated the charge that Loral Space and Communications Corp. had “improperly”"* 
helped the Chinese in upgrading their antiquated missile systems. The company denied 
any wrong doing in the matter, but the perception of the event in the press dovetailed 
reports o f espionage that were advanced by the “Cox Report.”
A  more general fear that dominated the coverage of China in the press was the idea 
that China was actively pursuing a program of military modernization aimed at 
dislodging American tactical hegemony in the East Asian hemisphere. Renowned China
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scholar David Shambough observed that China, in fact, was involved in bringing its 
military capabilities up to twenty-first century technological standards, but this did not 
represent a direct attempt on the part o f Beijing to disrupt the balance o f power that 
existed in the region/^ In Shambough’s view, the more probable reason for 
technological standardization was deterrence; a pohcy ultimately based on defensive 
principles o f national security.
In contrast to this more non-cataclysmic conclusion, the press created a dramatically 
adversarial picture o f Chinese mihtary restructuring. Newsweek reporter Michael Hirsh 
summarized the goals o f the PLA in purely negative terms when he wrote, “Beijing seeks 
to modernize its armed forces to project power in the South China Sea in the 21®* 
century.”^^  With regard to nuclear capabihties and the structural dimensions o f Beijing’s 
mihtary buildup, Douglas Waher, in a 1999 Time article entitled “China’s Arms Race,” 
wrote that “the world’s most populous country wants the world’s best mihtary,” because 
it plans on upgrading technical capabihties so it can conduct “limited war under high-tech 
conditions.” "^* Hence, by portraying the geo-political intentions o f the PRC as blatantly 
offensive in nature and a threat to the stability o f East Asia, the press reports molded an 
image o f China as a country that was politically and economicaUy defiant, with respect to 
“global” norms o f conduct.
Lastly, the most pertinent development that arose in the area o f cross-cultural 
relations was the philosophical and rhetorical shift in America’s dialogue regarding 
liberal-democracy and the free market. Due to the collapse o f Soviet c o m m un ism , the 
international movement toward economic and cultural globalization increased 
substantially. Without an ideological foe such as the Soviet Union to thwart the
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prolifération o f  liberal-democratic values on a global scale, the 1990’s have witnessed the 
integration o f  post-communist nations into the commercial milieu. Within the national 
confines o f the United States, the conceptual underpinning o f  capitahsm, democracy, and 
individual fireedoms evolved along similar lines. During the era o f  ambivalence, 
American policy makers and joumahsts argued that democratic concepts of government 
and firee trade were cultural forces that originated in the west; while maintaining 
universal applicability. By the end of the decade, however, a rhetorical shift occurred in 
which Americans repeatedly posited the geographic basis o f  capitalism and democracy in 
more general, global terms. Suddenly, the political roots o f  human liberty and self- 
expression were not premised around the western tradition. The international 
community, instead, became the source o f  free thinking and human self-expression. As 
the bulk o f this analysis has hitherto contended, the socio-ideological basis for American 
reactions to Chinese poUtical developments were founded on political principles cast in 
the light o f western liberal-democracy. This ingrained ethic o f  response to foreign crises 
was effectively transformed into an accepted socio-philosophical system that 
encompassed the global community, save those nations that functioned under 
authoritarian regimes.
With respect to the diffusion o f American ideals, literary critic Frederic Jameson has 
observed a similar phenomenon in the internationalization o f  American popular culture. 
American film companies, in an effort to seize markets abroad, have targeted Latin 
American, European, and Asian consumer markets with American cinematic productions. 
For this reason, Jameson contends, indigenous cultural expression has been stifled by the 
onslaught o f American films within these nations.^^ In the international political sphere
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the globalization o f democratic values and institutional ideals progressed similarly. Since 
the foundation o f the global economic structure functions under premises of commercial 
exchange that evolved in the western political-economic setting, the recent intensification 
o f international commerce has cast the dialogue o f poUtical-economic reform under the 
rubric o f global expectations and ideals. The depiction o f China in the late 1990s echoed 
this unprecedented alteration in the international arena. In fact, the most interesting 
development at this time was that journalists withdrew most references to American 
ideahsm fi'om their reports. Apparently, emotional appeals to the core beliefs of the 
western tradition were no longer necessary in securing the primacy o f liberal-democratic 
values.
The validation required in indicting China for military expansionism and political
malevolence came with the flurry o f support that Aonericans offered Taiwan during the
cross strait conflict. Rather than isolating China firom the global community, American
pohcy makers and journalists advocated a long-term strategic solution to the rising power
o f the PRC. President Clinton presented this plan as an intricate variable within the
overall plan o f comprehensive engagement. In a 1998 special report printed in
Newsweek magazine, Clinton summarized the nature o f  his policy. By applying the new
mode of pohtical discourse and standardization to his program, Clinton called for an
intensification o f engagement on all possible fironts:
In short, America has an interest in a stable, secure and open China that embraces 
political pluralism, firee markets and the rule o f law and joins us in working to build a 
secure international order. Working with China serves our interest in open trade. 
Access to its markets remains far too restricted. We could retaliate... [o]r we can 
keep pressing China to open its markets and to join the World Trade Organization on 
commercially meaningful term s... The more we bring China into the world, the more 
the world brings fireedom to China.^^
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National integration into the global matrix is a multifaceted process, however. 
President Clinton packaged a wide variety o f issues into the above comment, but the most 
crucial aspect o f  this globahzation process was the commercial economy. In advancing a 
more prosperous and open China, the popular press affirmed the vahdity o f the idea that 
the international marketplace was the tool by which closed societies were to become 
actors in a new economic structure that embraced all willing participants. Mortimer 
Zuckerman captured this commercial axiom marvelously when stating, “for survival [in 
the global milieu],” the author declared, “China must integrate with the world economy 
—  and therefore shrink the role o f the state.”^^  In order to achieve such an outcome in 
the political-economy o f the nation, Newsweek writer Michael Hirsh pointed to China’s 
possible entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a means o f  securing a 
peaceful coexistence with its trading partners. If  foreign companies further their financial 
stake in the Chinese domestic market, so the argument went, the central government 
would be forced to accept international standards o f trade and market exchange.^® The 
basic logic o f the argument is that as non-national influence penetrates the conservatism 
o f dogmatic socialism and hence the state, this process will coax the nation’s leaders into 
fully converting state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) and semi-socialized firms into privately 
owned and operated entities. Moreover, the use o f the WTO as a mechanism for bringing 
about this sanguine outcome was posited by Hirsh as the next major hurdle in U.S.-China 
relations.
In a philosophical sense, America’s underlying assumptions about reform and social 
change in contemporary China had come full circle. Within popular discourse, 
notwithstanding the cross-cultural antagonism that typified the three concluding years of
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the decade, the idea prevailed that the inclusion of China into the global nettwork o f 
cultural dialogue, trade, and communication was imperative, if  its entry in to  the global 
community was to occur on peaceful terms. Moreover, the habitual appeal o f 
government officials and journalists to western idealism as the driving force  o f cultural 
transformation waned during this period, because as British sociologist Mamfin Albrow 
has observed, global perspectives on cultural development and political evolution have 
replaced regional, localized, and national forms o f social discourse.^^ Therefore, the past 
decade has witnessed a progressive rise in American hesitancy about China, and later the 
increased cross-cultural disdain for a political-economic system that govemoment analysts 
and joumahsts viewed as possibly threatening the supremacy o f American m ilitary power 
in East Asia.
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CONCLUSION, AND THE CREATION 
OF HISTORICAL FICTION 
The chronological format o f this project has centered around the primary thesis that 
as Sino-American relations have progressed in the past decade, American cultural 
misperceptions and popular judgments o f Chinese social, pohtical, and economic 
developments resulted in the formulation o f a fictional history o f  contemporary China. 
The existence o f a strong ideological inclination toward interpreting foreign cultures via 
domestic standards o f  evolutionary progression was illustrated as the primary cause o f 
these inaccurate and often uncritical ethnocentric conclusion. Beginning in the pre- 
Tiananmen period, popular images of China concentrated on the reformist nature o f the 
Deng regime while de-emphasizing the pohtical constraints that were characteristic o f 
Chinese pohtical culture in this era.
After the Tiananmen Square massacre, however, the American government began to 
focus intensively on the highly negative and unpredictable nature o f the regime in China. 
In addition, the possibihty that China in the coming years could very well become an 
aggressive economic and military giant in the region, was also another factor that moved 
to the forefront o f  the pohcy debate. Even though the economic stance of the United 
States remained much the same after the incident, emphasis was increasingly placed on
97
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non-proliferation, the nature o f  the communist regime, human rights, Chinese 
expansionism, and relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Because the images that the 
press produced were so volatile and culturally biased, the first chapter o f a fictional 
history regarding the socio-political evolution o f China was created in the media.
Because American institutions such as the government and the press have a unique 
missionary nature, in terms o f  propagating American ideals abroad, the returned images 
about the socio-pohtical climate in China were tainted with an ethnocentric negativity. 
Policy makers and the media refused to look past the blood that had been spilled in 
Beijing to ascertain the true nature o f the incident, therefore, a skewed impression of 
these two tumultuous months was presented to the public, with only minimal information 
about the deeper political, social, and cultural elements o f the Tiananmen fiasco.
In the wake of the Tiananmen debacle, America’s optimism dwindled quickly and 
popular-political images o f  China swung dramatically in the opposite direction, to create 
an atmosphere in which modifications in Beijing’s reform policies and economic 
advancements were viewed in a duahstic/ambivalent manner. When Chinese leaders 
decided to undertake mihtary exercises in the Taiwan Strait in mid-1995, America’s 
perceptions of the PRC swung even further in a distinctly negative direction; an event 
that marked the outset o f a three-year period during which Chinese military 
modernization was seen as a direct threat to America’s military preeminence in East Asia.
In the greater scheme o f  cross-cultural image periodization, the Taiwan Strait crisis 
galvanized American fears o f  Chinese expansionism and military intimidation. With a 
critical eye focused upon the mihtary and nuclear capabilities o f China, the American 
government, during the second Clinton ad m in is tra tio n , fabricated the scenario that China
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was actively involved in upgrading its nuclear arsenal, as a means o f  eventually 
challenging America’s military hegemony in East Asia. Previous fears about the nature 
o f post-Cold War politics in China, especially the anxiety witnessed in the era o f 
uncertainty, matured in a radically negative direction following the Taiwan incident. As 
the transitional point that brought an end to the post-Tiananmen period, the Taiwan crisis 
intensified domestic anxiety and fostered the myth that China had taken the place o f the 
Soviet Union as the geo-political adversary o f the United States. Although images and 
literary descriptions o f China cast a unsavory light over Beijing’s long-term intentions in 
Asia, American expectations o f Chinese political-economic restructuring remained fairly 
optimistic. However, the socio-philosophical rhetoric of this period downplayed the 
notion that China needed to accept western ideals and standards o f political evolution. 
Rather, the liberal-democratic assumptions through which American correspondents and 
government officials interpreted developments in China were reformulated to meet the 
needs o f an international economic order that fimctioned under common principles of 
individual fi-eedom, representative government, and firee enterprise.
This feature o f America’s cross-cultural depiction of China was arguably the most 
pertinent ideological modification o f the post-Cold War period. Throughout the Cold 
War and during the decade that followed the collapse o f Soviet communism, the socio- 
philosophical core o f American liberal-democracy was conceptually tied to its indigenous 
roots within the libertarian tradition o f the United States and the European 
Enhghtenment. Different facets o f this tradition carried various levels o f ideological 
weight at specific junctures in Sino-American relations, but ultimately, the cultural 
supremacy of western democratic thinking was reaffirmed in virtually all cases. In the
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1990s, as a result o f  the political-economic transformations that were undertaken by post­
communist nations, the capitalist (free-market) ethos gained additional acceptance in 
Eastern Europe and East Asia. Communism, as a viable alternative to the social 
problems created by the free-market, was no longer lauded by left-wing theorists, 
populists, and national socialists as a credible structure o f government that could 
eradicate the social ills o f capitalism. As such, the free-market ethic, procedural 
democracy, consumerism, and individualism, attained a preeminent status in the 
international political sphere. Since the marketplace o f ideas functioned under the 
premises o f liberal-democracy as the underlying force o f  commercial innovation, the 
philosophy acquired a global character. W ithin the new global structure o f  markets, 
liberal-democracy was said to have received unanimous acceptance by the nations whose 
economic maturation had been stifled under socialism. In many ways, as Francis 
Fukuyama suggested, the triumph o f democracy has ushered in a new epoch in human 
history where a nation’s success depends on its adaptability to the modem condition. It 
remains to be seen, however, if the fruits o f  a  burgeoning market can remedy the 
countless social ills (poverty, unemployment, and social dislocation) that are endemic to 
laissez-faire capitalism and procedural democracy.
In sum, when these transitions in attitude are viewed as part o f a greater historical 
picture, popular depictions o f China in the past decade have contributed to the legacy of 
existing Cold War stereotypes regarding communist and post-communist nations. The 
methods o f reform, the intentions o f student demonstrators and the relations o f  the 
conservative elite, the culture of Chinese free enterprise, and the objectives o f  military 
modernization are but a few o f the questions that Americans have answered through a
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contemptuous lens o f  anti-socialist disdain and statist economic intervention. As a result, 
academic conclusions regarding the political nature o f contemporary China have rarely 
corresponded with the less objective conclusions propagated by their counterparts in the 
profession o f  journalism.
Finally, i f  globalization has brought about the internationalization o f cultural norms 
and political ideals as this study has suggested, the mode o f analysis apphed in this 
examination will require subtle reconfiguration for future case studies o f this sort. The 
notion o f  an ideological superstructure as the basis for the perpetuation and transmition of 
culture is a feasible point o f departure for cross-national inquiry between nation-states, 
but when the boundaries that maintain the integrity o f socio-philosophical norms within 
the confines o f  a particular nation-state are cast aside or progressively deconstructed, 
Chomsky’s firamework o f a cultural superstructure is insufficient in explaining the 
nuances that are fostered by the cross-assimilation o f values. For example, how might 
the social analyst examine the proliferation o f democratic ideals, individuahsm, and 
consumerism, i f  the geographic source o f these principles is no longer analytically 
tangible? How does a student of cultural transmition locate the domestic reaction to 
heterogeneous forms o f thought when the demarcation o f international political and 
ethical differences is gradually fading. These and other vital issues, in the coming 
decade, will compel the academic community to engage the modifications that 
globalization has generated within the spatial dynamics o f cross-cultural studies. As 
such, the fluidity o f modernity has destroyed the cultural isolationism of the twentieth- 
century and replaced it with the global epoch o f  commercial internationalism.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
END NOTES
CHAPTER 1
‘ Dwight H. Perkins, “How China’s Economic Transformation Shapes Its Future,” in 
Living with China: U.S./China Relations in the Twentv-First Century, ed. Ezra F. Vogel 
(New York, 1997), p. 142.
 ^Richard Madsen. China and the American Dream. (Berkeley, 1995), 1-29.
 ^Herbert G. Gutman, Work. Culture, and Society in Industrializing A m e r ic a :  Essavs in 
American Working-class and Social History. (New York, 1976), xiii.
Lynn Hunt, The New Cultural History. (Berkeley, 1989), 12.
 ^Ibid., 12-13.
 ^John Storey, An Introductory Guide to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture. (Athens, 
1993), 182.
 ^Ibid., 5.
^Ibid.
 ^Colin Mackerras, Western Images of China. (Oxford, 1989), 3.
Stuart Creighton Miller, The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American Image o f the 
Chinese. 1785-1882. (Berkeley, 1969), 8.
’ * Paul Shankman, ‘T he Thick and the Thin: On the Interpretive Theoretical Program o f  
Clifford Geertz,” Current Anthropology. Volume 25, Issue 3 (June 1984), 261.
Jonathan D. Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent: China in Western Minds, (New 
York, 1998), xviii.
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism. (London, 1930), 47. 
CHAPTER 2
* Madsen, China and the American Dream: 16.
 ^Ibid.
 ^Mike Cormack, Ideology. (Ann Arbor, 1992), 13.
Cormack, Ideology; 11.
 ^Graeme Turner, British Cultural Studies: An Introduction. (London, 1990), 26.
 ^John A. Hall, Liberalism: Politics. Ideology, and the Market. (Chapel Hill, 1987), 173.
 ^Madsen, China and the American Dream: 39-40.
® Ibid., 39.
 ^Ibid., 92.
102
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
Jie Chen, Ideology in U.S. Foreign Pohcv: Case Studies in U.S. China Policy. 
(Westport, 1992), 6.
Noam Chomsky, Powers and Prospects: Reflections on Human Nature and the Social 
Order. (Boston, 1996), 71-72.
Ibid., 71.
Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order. (New York, 
1999), 43-44.
Mark Gottdiener, “Hegemony and Mass Culture: A Semiotic Approach,” American 
Journal o f  Sociology. Volume 90, Issue 5 (March 1985), 981.
Yanmin Yu, ‘Trojecting the China Image: News Making and News Reporting in the 
United States,” in Image. Perception, and the Making o f U.S.-China Relations, eds. 
Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong (New York, 1998), p. 49.
Ibid., 53.
Ibid.
Jay Mathews and Linda Mathews, “The Journalist China Specialists,” in American 
Studies o f  Contemporary China, ed. David Shambough (New York, 1993), p. 229.
CHAPTERS
 ^Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century. (Oxford,
1990), 132.
 ^Robert S. Ross, ed.. The United States and The Soviet Union: Tripolaritv and Policy 
Making in the Cold War. (New York, 1993), 173.
 ^Jacques M. Downs, “The Commercial Origins of American Attitudes toward China, 
1784-1844,” in America Views China: American Images o f China Then and Now, eds. 
Jonathan Goldstein, Jerry Israel, and Hilary Conroy (London, 1991), p. 56.
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972. 
(Washington D.C., 1992), 215.
 ^Cormack, Ideology: 9.
 ^Kailai Huang, “Myth or Reality: American Perceptions o f the China Market,” in Image. 
Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations, eds. Hongshan Li and Zhaohui 
Hong (New York, 1998), p. 37.
 ^Harding, A Fragile Relationship: 215.
 ^American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1987, Address bv Secretary o f  State 
Shultz Before the Dalian Management Training Center. Dalian. China. March 3. 1987 
(Extracts). 532.
 ^Ibid., 533.
Ibid., 534.
’ ^  American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1988, Department o f State Briefing. 
March 9. 1988 (Extracts). 529.
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1988, Address bv the Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs (Armacost) Before the National Council for United States- 
China Trade. June 1. 1988 (Extracts). 531.
Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1988, Statement bv Secretary o f  State 
Shultz. December 15. 1988 (Extracts). 537.
Ibid., 538.
Kenneth Lieberthal, “Domestic Forces and Sino-U.S. Relations,” in Living with China: 
U.S./China Relations in the Twentv-First Century, ed. Ezra F. Vogel (New York, 1997), 
p. 259.
 ^United States Department o f State Bureau o f  Public Affairs Washington D C ., Global 
Human Rights Violations. (Current Pohcy No. 1164), 1-4.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1987, Prepared Statement bv the Denutv 
Assistant Secretary o f State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Roy). September 17. 1987 
(Extracts). 539.
Ibid.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1987, Prepared Statement bv the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary o f State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Rov). October 14. 1987 
540-541.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1988, Department o f  State Briefing. 
March 9. 1988 (Extracts). 531.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1988, Statement bv Secretary o f State 
Shultz. December 15. 1988 (Extracts). 538.
Paul A. Cohen, Discovering Historv in China: American Historical Writing on the 
Recent Chinese Past. (New York, 1984), chap. 2.
Kathleen Hartford, “Summer 1988-Spring 1989 The Ferment Before the “Turmoil,” in 
China’s Search For Democracy: The Student and Mass Movement o f  1989. ed. Suzanne 
Ogden (New York, 1993), p. 4-5.
^  Harding, A Fragile Relationship: 217.
Hartford, “Summer 1988-Spring 1989;” 6-7.
Ibid.
Nan Lin, The Struggle for Tiananmen: Anatomy of the 1989 Mass Movement. 
(Westport, 1992), 3.
Ibid., 21.
Ibid., 21-48.
Harding, A Fragile Relationship: 222.
Mei-ling Wang, “Creating a Virtual Enemy: U.S.-China Relations in Print,” in Image. 
Perception, and the Making o f  U.S.-China Relations, eds. Hongshan Li and Zhaohui 
Hong (New York, 1998), p. 81.
Daniel Benjamin, “State o f Siege,” Time. (May 29, 1989), 37.
Ibid.
Dusko Doder, “Marriage o f Convenience,” U.S. News & World Report. (May 15,
1989), 30.
James Wallace, “Reinventing China,” U.S. News & World Report. (May 29, 1989), 30- 
31.
Larry Martz, “China’s Rising Tide o f Unrest,” Newsweek. (May 8, 1989), 30. 
Newsweek. (May 29, 1989), cover.
Madsen, China and the American Dream: 4-5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
^  Dusko Doder, “Marriage o f Convenience,” U.S. News & World Report (May 15, 
1989), 31.
James Wallace, “Reinventing China,” U.S. News & World Report. (May 29, 1989), 31. 
Maurice Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inouirv into the Fate o f  Chinese 
Socialism. 1978-1994. (New York, 1996), chap. 14.
Sandra Burton, Time. (May 29, 1989), 41-44.
"^Ibid.
U.S. News & World Report. (Mav 1, 1989), 15; James Wallace, “Reinventing China,” 
U.S. News & World Report. (May 29, 1989), 32.
Larry Martz, “China’s Rising Tide o f Unrest, Newsweek. (May 8, 1989), 32.
James Wallace, “Reinventing China,” U.S. News & World Report. (May 29, 1989), 34; 
James Wallace, “Forcing Change on a Reluctant China,” U.S. News & World Report. 
(May 8, 1989), 46.
Daniel Benjamin, “State o f Siege.” Time. (May 29, 1989), 41-42.
Russell Watson, Newsweek. (May 29, 1989), 22.
Ibid., 24.
James Wallace, “Again, China’s Young Challenge the Old Order,” U.S. News &
World Report. (May 29, 1989), 34.
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1989, Press Conference bv President 
Bush. June 5. 1989 (Extract). 517.
Ibid.
Ibid., 518.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents, Press Conference bv President Bush. 
June 8. 1989 (Extracts). 520.
Ibid., 521.
Jesse Bimbaum and Howard G. Chua-eoan, “Despair and Death In a Beijing Square,” 
Time. (June 12, 1989), 26.
George J. Church, “Saving the Connection,” Time. (June 19, 1989), 31.
Newsweek. (June 19, 1989), 22.
CHAPTER 4
 ^Julia Chang Bloch, “Commercial Diplomacy,” in Living with China: U.S./China 
Relations in the Twentv-First Centurv. ed. Ezra Vogel (New York, 1997), p. 189.
^Ibid.
 ^Richard Baum, Burving Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping.
(Princeton, 1994), chap. 13.
Kermeth Mason, “The Multinational Corporation: Central Institution o f Our Age,” in 
Corporations and the Common Good, eds. Robert B. Dickie and Leroy S. Rouner (Notre 
Dame, 1986), p. 78-79.
 ^United States Department o f State Bureau o f  Public Affairs Washington D C ., The 
Promise o f Pacific Economic Cooperation. (Current Pohcy No. 1208), 1.
^Ibid.
 ^Pubhc Papers o f  the President of the United States, William J. Clinton. July 1 to 
December 31. 1996. 1125.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
* United States Department o f State Bureau o f Public Affairs Washington D.C., 
Ambassador Charlene Barshefskv. U.S. Trade Representative. USTR Testimony before  
the House Wavs and Means Trade Subcommittee June 11 .1996.1.
 ^David M. Lampton, “A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the Global 
Order,” in Living with China: U.S./China Relations in the Twentv-First Centurv. ed. Ezra 
Vogel (New York, 1997), p. 123-124.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f Public Affairs Washington D C ., U.S. 
Actions Toward China. (Policy No. 1247), 5.
Jan Prybyla, “The Chinese Communist Economic State in Comparative Perspective,” 
in The Modem Chinese State, ed. David Shambaugh (Cambridge, 2000), p. 213.
United States Department o f  State Bureau o f East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimonv 
bv Peter Tamoff Under Secretary o f State for Political Affairs Mav 16. 1996. 1.
Madsen, China and the American Dream: 133.
Jan S. Prybyla, ‘Ts China a Model o f Economic Success?,” in The Roles o f the United 
States. Russia, and China in the New World Order, ed. Hafeez Malik (New York, 1997),
p. 323.
 ^Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. (Cambridge, 1999), 127.
Public Papers o f  the President of the United States, George Bush. January to June 30. 
1991. 567.
Ibid.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony 
bv Kent Wiedemann Deputy Assistant Secretary o f State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs July 25. 1995. 3.
Ibid.
Wm. Theodore de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian 
Communitarian Perspective. (Cambridge, 1998), chap. 8.
Jing Lin, The Opening of the Chinese Mind: Democratic Changes in China Since 1978. 
(London, 1994), 163-164.
Wei-ming Tu, “The Enlightenment Mentahty and the Chinese Intellectual Dilemma,” 
Perspectives on Modem China: Four Anniversaries, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal (New York,
1991), p. 115.
United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington, D C .,
Freedom and World Prosperity. (Current Policy No. 1210), 1.
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1990, Statement bv the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schiffer). Beijing. 
December 19. 1990. 699-700.
Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China. Tibet, and the Dalai 
Lama. (Berkeley, 1997), 93.
Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: 35-36.
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1990, Statement bv the Assistant 
Secretary o f State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schiffer). Beijing. 
December 19. 1990. 700.
United States Department o f State, John Shattuck. Assistant Secretary for Democracy. 
Human Rights, and Labor. Washington. D C. March 16. 1995. 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107
United States Department o f State, Statement o f Ambassador Winston Lord. October 
11. 1995.2.
Public Papers o f the President of the United States, William J. Clinton. July 1 to 
December 31. 1995. 1245.
Xiaobing Li, “New War o f Nerves: Mao’s Legacy in Beijing’s Policy toward Taiwan,” 
in Image. Perception, and the Making o f U.S.-China Relations, eds. Hongshan Li and 
Zhaohui Hong (New York, 1998), p. 366.
Michael Kramer, “Free to Fly Inside the Cage,” Time. (October 2, 1989), 64.
Jeanne Gordon, “China’s Renegade Province,” Newsweek. (February 17, 1992), 35.
Ibid.
Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions o f Authority.
(London, 1985), 186.
Steven Strasser, “China: Western ad agencies move in,” Newsweek. (March 14, 1994), 
39.
Ibid.
Frank Gibney, “No Time to Waste on Theory: A Chinese Communist becomes an auto 
mogul.” Newsweek. (January 18, 1993), 43.
Ibid.
Joe Klein, “Twilight of the Emperor,” Newsweek. (November 22, 1993), 43.
David L. Anderson, Imperialism and Idealism: American Diplomats in China. 1861- 
1865. (Bloomington, 1985), chap. 3, p. 65.
Susan V. Lawrance, “Making Connections in China,” U.S. News & World Report. 
(April 5, 1993), 56.
Michael Kramer, “The Courage to Change,” Time. (June 6, 1994), 26.
^  John Rothchild, “Bear in the China Shop,” Time. (November 28, 1994), 45.
Bruce W. Nelan, “Watch Out For China,” Time. (November 29, 1993), 36.
Joe Klein, “Why China Does It Better,” Newsweek. (April 12, 1993), 23.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Marc Levinson, “Some Cracks in the Wall o f the Miracle Economy,” Newsweek. (May 
16, 1994), 46.
Mortimer B. Zuckerman, “The Steady-hand Economy,” U.S. News & World Report. 
riMay27, 1991), 45.
Ibid.
Steven Butler, “China’s capitalist frontier,” U.S. News & World Report. (November 
22, 1993), 39.
Russell Watson, “A Little Fight Music,” Newsweek. (February 13, 1995), 38.
Ibid.
Tom Post, “No Free Lunches Here,” Newsweek. (February 20, 1995), 39.
C.S. Manegold, “A Bleak Legacy of Suppression,” Newsweek. (May 28, 1990), 40.
Tom Post, “Getting Fed Up With China,” Newsweek, (May 20, 1991), 39.
Frank Gibney Jr., “The Trouble With China,” Newsweek. (May 17, 1993), 46.
Ibid.
Susan V. Lawrance, “How not to pressure China,” U.S. News & World Report.
(January 31, 1994), 55.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
Susan V. Lawrance, “Holding up half the sky,” U.S. News & World Report. (August 
28/September 4, 1995), 46.
“  Ibid.
Carroll Bogert, “Making It Hard on Hillary,” Newsweek. (August 28, 1995), 45.
^  Carroll Bogert, “Leaving Them to Starve,” Newsweek. (January 15, 1996), 42.
Ibid.
Carrol Bogert, “Rethinking Family Values,” Newsweek. (January 22, 1996), 44. 
James Walsh, “Spirit o f  Sisterhood,” Time. (September 18, 1995), 80.
Anthony Spaeth, “Tempest in a Golden Um.” Time. (December 11, 1995), 63.
Susan V. Lawrence, “Two people, one land,” U.S. News & World Report. (June 7, 
1993), 47.
Tom Post, “Reaching Out to a Tiger,” Newsweek. (June 5, 1995), 34.
Tom Post, “Riding the Tiger.” Newsweek. (February 19, 1996), 44.
Tom Post, “Chinese Fireworks.” Newsweek. (March 18, 1996), 33.
CHAPTER 5
 ^Charles Stewart Goodwin, The Third World Centurv. (New York, 1994), xiv, intro..
 ^Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: 19.
^Ibid.
The White House Office o f  the Press Secretary, Remarks bv the President in Foreign 
Policv Speech. April 7. 1999. 2.
 ^United States Department o f  State Bureau o f Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., China’s 
Mihtary Modernization. June 3. 1997. 1.
 ^Report o f The House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and 
Mihtarv/Commercial Concerns with The People’s Repubhc o f  China. 105^  ^Congress, 
January 3, 1999, ii.
’ ibid.
*Ibid.
 ^The White House Office o f  the Press Secretary, Remarks bv the President in Foreign 
Pohcv Speech. April 7. 1999. 3.
Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience. (Oxford, 1985), 14.
Zygmunt Bauman, Globahzation: The Human Consequences. (New York, 1998), 
chaps. 1, 2.
Francis Fukuyama, The End o f  Historv and The Last Man. (New York, 1992), intro. 
United States Department o f  State Bureau o f East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S.- 
China Relations. June 20. 1997. 2.
United States Department o f  State Bureau o f East Asian and Pacific Affairs, China’s 
Human Rights Record. June 20. 1997. 1.
The White House Office o f  the Press Secretary, Remarks bv the President in Foreign 
Pohcv Speech. April 7. 1999. 5.
United States Department o f  State Bureau o f Pubhc Affairs, China and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). June 3. 1997. 1.
Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict With China. (New York, 
1997), 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
Ibid.
William J. Holstein, “The year o f  the hawk?,” U.S. News & World Report. (April 7, 
1997), 45.
Ibid., 46.
Ronald Brownstein, “Red Scare?,” U.S. News & World Report. (June 8, 1998), 20. 
David Shambaugh, “The People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Republic at 50: 
Reform at Last,” China Ouarterlv. number 159, (September 1999), 660-672.
Michael Hirsh, “The Chill Over China,” Newsweek. (May 5, 1997), 45.
Douglas Waller, “China’s Arms Race,” Time. (February 1, 1999), 32.
Frederic Jameson, “Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue,” in The Cultures 
o f  Globalization, ed. Frederic Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (London, 1998), p. 54-77. 
Bill Clinton, “Why I’m Going to Beijing,” Newsweek. (June 29, 1998), 28.
Mortimer B. Zuckerman, “China’s star is still rising,” U.S. News & World Report. 
(November 17, 1997), 84.
Michael Hirsh, “Tricks of Trade,” Newsweek. (June 29, 1998), 40-42.
Martin Albrow, The Global Age: State and Society Bevond Modernity. (Stanford,
1996), intro..
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Albrow, Martin- The Global Age: State and Society Bevond Modernity. Stanford, 1996.
Anderson, David L. Imperialism and Idealism: American Diplomats in China. 1861- 
1865. Bloomington, 1985.
Baum, Richard. Burving Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age o f Deng Xiaoping. Princeton,
1994.
Bauman, Zygmunt. Globalization: The Human Consequences. New York, 1998.
Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Munro. The Coming Conflict With China. New York,
1997.
Chen, Jie. Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policv. Westport, 1992.
Chomsky, Noam. Powers and Prospects: Reflections on Human Nature and the Social 
Order. Boston, 1996.
Chomsky, Noam. Profit Over People: Neo liberalism and Global Order. New York, 1999.
Cohen, Paul A. Discovering Historv in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent 
Chinese Past. New York, 1984.
Cohen, Stephen F. Rethinking the Soviet Experience. Oxford, 1985.
Cormack, Mike. Ideology. Ann Arbor, 1992.
De Bary, Wilham Theodore. Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian 
Communitarian Perspective. Cambridge, 1998.
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of Historv and The Last Man. New York, 1992.
Goodwin, Charles Stewart. The Third World Centurv. New York, 1994.
110
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I l l
Goldstein, Melvyn C. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China. Tibet and the Dalai Lama. 
Berkeley, 1997.
Gutman, Herbert G. Work. Culture, and Societv in Industrializing America: Essavs in 
American Working-class and Social Historv. New York, 1976.
Hall, John A. Liberalism: Politics. Ideology, and the Market. Chapel Hill, 1987.
Harding, Harry. A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972. 
Washington D.C., 1992.
Hunt, Lynn. The New Cultural Historv. Berkeley, 1989.
Lin, Jing. The Opening o f the Chinese Mind: Democratic Changes in China Since 1978. 
London, 1994.
Lin, Nan. The Struggle for Tiananmen: Anatomy o f  the 1989 Mass Movement.
Westport, 1992.
Mackerras, Cohn. Western Images of China. Oxford, 1989.
Madsen, Richard. China and the American Dream. Berkeley, 1995.
Meisner, Maurice. The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate o f Chinese 
Socialism. 1978-1994. New York, 1996.
Miller, Stuart Creighton. The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American Image o f the 
Chinese. 1785-1882. Berkeley, 1969.
Pye, Lucian. Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority. London, 
1985.
Robert Ross, ed.. The United States and The Soviet Union: Tripolaritv and Policv 
Making in the Cold War. New York, 1993.
Schaller, Michael. The United States and China in the Twentieth Centurv. Oxford, 1990.
Spence, Jonathan D. The Chan’s Great Continent: China in Western Minds. New York, 
1998.
Storey, John. An Introductory Guide to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture. Athens, 
1993.
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism. London, 1930.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
112
Zheng, Yongnian. Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. Cambridge, 1999.
ARTICLES
Bloch, Julia Chang. “Commercial Diplomacy.” In Living with China: U.S./China
Relations in the Twentv-First Centurv. pp. 185-216. Edited by Ezra F. Vogel. New 
York, 1997.
Downs, Jacques M. “The Commercial Origins of American Attitudes toward China, 
1784-1844.” In America Views China: American Images o f  China Then and Now. 
pp. 56-66. Edited by Jonathan Goldstein, Jerry Israel, and Hilary Conroy. London, 
1991.
Gottdiener, Mark. “Hegemony and Mass Culture: A Semiotic Approach.” American 
Journal o f Sociology. Volume 90, Issue 5 (March 1985), 979-1001.
Hartford, Kathleen. “Summer 1988-Spring 1989 The Ferment Before the “Turmoil.” In 
China’s Search For Democracy: The Student and Mass Movement o f 1989. pp. 3-24. 
Edited by Suzanne Ogden. New York, 1993.
Huang, Kailai. “Myth or Reahty: American Perceptions o f  the China Market.” In Image. 
Perception, and the Making o f U.S.-China Relations, pp. 17-42. Edited by Hongshan 
Li and Zhaohui Hong. New York, 1998.
Jameson, Frederic. “Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue.” In The Cultures of 
Globalization, pp. 54-77. Edited by Frederic Jameson and Masao Miyoshi. London,
1998.
Lampton, David M. “A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the Global 
Order,” In Living with China: U.S./China Relations in the Twentv-First Centurv. pp. 
120-140. Edited by Ezra F. Vogel. New York, 1997.
Li, Xiaobing. “New War o f Nerves: Mao’s Legacy in Beijing’s Policy toward Taiwan.”
In Image. Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations, pp. 365-388. Edited 
by Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong. New York, 1998.
Lieberthal, Kenneth. “Domestic Forces and Sino-U.S. Relations.” In Living with China: 
U.S./China Relations in the Twentv-First Centurv. pp. 254-276. Edited by Ezra F. 
Vogel. New York, 1997.
Mason, Kenneth. “The Multinational Corporation: Central Institution o f Our Age.” In 
Corporations and the Common Good, pp. 78-90. Edited by Robert B. Dickie and 
Leroy S. Rouner. Notre Dame, 1986.
Mathews, Jay and Linda. “The JoumaUst China Specialists.” In American Studies of 
Contemporary China, pp. 229-239. Edited by David Shambaugh. New York, 1993.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
Perkins, Dwight H. “How China’s Economic Transformation Shapes Its Future.” In 
Living With China: U.S./China Relations in the Twentv-First Centurv. pp. 141-164. 
Edited by Ezra F. Vogel. New York, 1997.
Pryblya, Jan S. “Is China a Model o f Economic Success?” In The Roles o f the United 
States. Russia, and China in the New World Order, pp. 300-325. Edited by Hazeef 
Malik. New York, 1997.
Pryblya, Jan S. “The Chinese Communist State in Comparative Perspective.” In The 
Modem Chinese State, pp. 188-215. Edited by David Shambaugh. Cambridge, 2000.
Shambaugh, David. “The People’s Liberation Army at 50: Reform at Last.” China 
Ouarterlv. number 159, (September 1999), 660-672.
Shankman, Paul. “The Thick and the Thin: On the Interpretive Theoretical Program of 
CUfford Geertz.” Current Anthropology. Volume 25, Issue 3 (June 1984), 261-280.
Tu, Wei-ming. “The Enlightenment Mentahty and the Chinese Intellectual Dilemma.” In 
Perspectives on Modem China: Four Anniversaries, pp. 103-118. Edited by Kenneth 
Leiberthal. New York, 1991.
Wang, Mei-Ling. “Creating a Virtual Enemy: U.S.-China Relations in Print.” In Image. 
Perception, and the Making o f U.S.-China Relations, pp. 73-100. Edited by 
Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong. New York, 1998.
Yu, Yanmin. “Projecting the China Image: News Making and News Reporting in the 
United States.” In Image. Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations, pp. 
43-72. Edited by Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong. New York, 1998.
MAGAZINE ARTICLES
Benjamin, Daniel. “State o f Siege.” Time. (May 29, 1989), 37-45.
Bogert, Carroll. “Leaving Them to Starve.” Newsweek. (January 15, 1996), 42-43.
Bogert, Carroll. “Making It Hard on Hillary.” Newsweek. (August 28, 1995), 45.
Bogert, Carroll. “Rethinking Family Values.” Newsweek. (January 22, 1996), 44-45.
Brinbaum, Jesse and Howard G. Chua-eoan. “Despair and Death In a Beijing Square.” 
Time. (June 12, 1989), 24-27.
Brownstein, Ronald. “Red Scare?” U.S. News & World Report. (June 8, 1998), 20-23.
Burton, Sandra. Time. (May 29, 1989), 41-45.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
Butler, Steven. “China’s capitahst frontier.” U.S. News & World Report. (November 22, 
1993), 39-40.
Church, George J. “Saving the Connection.” Time. (June 19,1989), 30-32.
Clinton, Bill. “Why I’m Going to Beijing.” Newsweek. (June 29,1998), 28.
Doder, Dusko. “Marriage of Convenience.” U.S. News & World Report. (May 15, 1989), 
30-32.
Gibney, Frank. “No Time to Waste on Theory: A Chinese Communist becomes an auto 
mogul.” Newsweek. (January 18, 1993), 43.
Gibney, Frank. “The Trouble With China.” Newsweek. (May 17, 1993), 46.
Gordon, Jeanne. “China’s Renegade Province.” Newsweek. (February 17, 1992), 35-38.
Hirsh, Michael. “The Chill Over China.” Newsweek. (May 5,1997), 45-46.
Hirsh, Michael. “Tricks o f Trade.” Newsweek. (June 29, 1998), 40-42.
Holstein, William J. “The year o f the hawk?” U.S. News & World Report. (April 7,
1997), 45-47.
Klein, Joe. “Twilight o f the Emperor.” Newsweek. (November 22, 1993), 43.
Klein, Joe. “Why China Does It Better.” Newsweek. (April 12,1993), 23.
Kramer, Michael. “Free to Fly Inside the Cage.” Time. (October 2, 1989), 64-79.
Kramer, Michael. “The Courage to Change.” Time. (June 6, 1994), 26.
Lawrance, Susan V. “Holding up half the sky.” U.S. News & World Report. (August 
28/Spetember 4, 1995), 46-50.
Lawrance, Susan V. “How not to pressure China.” U.S. News & World Report. (January 
31, 1994), 55.
Lawrance, Susan V. “Making Connections in China.” U.S. News & World Report. (April 
5, 1993), 56-57.
Lawrance, Susan V. “Two people, one land.” U.S. News & World Report. (June 7, 1993), 
47-49.
Levinson, Marc. “Some Cracks in the Wall o f the Miracle Economy.” Newsweek. (May
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
16, 1994), 46.
Manegold, C.S. “A Bleak Legacy o f Suppression.” Newsweek. (May 28, 1990), 38-40.
Martz, Larry. “China’s Rising Tide o f Unrest.” Newsweek. (May 8, 1989), 30-32.
Nelan, Bruce. “Watch Out For China.” Time. (November 29, 1993), 36-39.
Post, Tom. “Chinese Fireworks.” Newsweek. (March 18, 1996), 30-33.
Post, Tom. “Getting Fed Up With China.” Newsweek. (May 20, 1991), 39.
Post, Tom. “No Free Lunches Here.” Newsweek. (February 20, 1995), 39-40.
Post, Tom. “Reaching out to a Tiger.” Newsweek. (June 5, 1995), 34-35.
Post, Tom. “Riding the Tiger.” Newsweek. (February 19, 1996), 44.
Rothchild, John. “Bear in the China Shop.” Time. (November 28, 1994), 45.
Spaeth, Anthony. “Tempest in a Golden Um.” Time. (December 11, 1995), 63.
Strasser, Steven. “China: Western ad agencies move in.” Newsweek. (March 14,1994), 
39.
Wallace, James. “Reinventing China.” U.S. News & World Report. (May 29, 1989), 30- 
34.
Wallace, James. “Again, China’s Young Challenge the Old Order.” U.S. News & World 
Report. (May 29, 1989), 34.
Waller, Douglas. “China’s Arms Race.” Time. (February 1, 1999), 32-34.
Walsh, James. “The Spirit o f Sisterhood.” Time. (September 18, 1995), 79-80.
Watson, Russell. Newsweek. (May 29, 1989), 16-28.
Watson, Russell. “A Little Fight Music.” Newsweek. (February 13, 1995), 38-39.
Zuckerman, Mortimer B. “The Steady-hand Economy.” U.S. News & World Report. 
(May 27, 1991), 45-46.
Zuckerman, Mortimer B. “China’s star is still rising.” U.S. News & World Report. 
(November 17, 1997), 83-85.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1987. Address bv Secretary o f State Shultz 
Before the Dalian Management Training Center. Dalian. China. March 3. 1987 
(Extracts). 532-535.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1987. Prepared Statement bv the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary o f  State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Rov). September 17. 
1987 (Extracts). 537-539.
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1987. Prepared Statement bv Deputy 
Assistant Secretary o f  State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Rov). October 14. 
1987 (Extracts). 540-543.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1988. Address bv the Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs (Armacost) Before the National Council for United States- 
China Trade. June 1. 1988 (Extracts). 531-533.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1988. Department o f State Briefing. March 
9. 1988 (Extracts). 529-531.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1988. Statement bv Secretary of State 
Shultz. December 15. 1988 (Extracts). 537-538.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1989. Press Conference bv President Bush. 
June 5. 1989 (Extracts). 517-519.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1989. Press Conference bv President Bush. 
June 8. 1989 (Extracts). 520-521.
American Foreign Pohcy Current Documents 1990. Statement bv the Assistant Secretary 
o f State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schifter). Beijing. December 
19. 1990. 699-700.
Pubhc Papers o f  the President o f the United States. George Bush. January to June 30. 
1991. 565-567.
Pubhc Papers o f the President o f the United States. Wilham J. Clinton. July 1 to 
December 31. 1995. 1237-1246.
Pubhc Papers o f the President o f the United States. Wilham J. Clinton. July 1 to 
December 31. 1996. 1118-1127.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
Report o f The House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with The People’s Republic o f  China. 105*
Congress, January 3, 1999. i-xxxvii (overview).
The White House Office o f the Press Secretary. Remarks bv the President in Foreign 
Policv Speech. April 7. 1999. 1-8.
United States Department o f State. John Shattuck. Assistant Secretary for Democracy. 
Human Rights, and Labor. Washington. D.C.. March 16. 1995.1 -2.
United States Department o f State. Statement of Ambassador Winston Lord. October 11.
1995. 1-3.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f  East Asian and Pacific A ffairs. C h ina’s 
Human Rights Record. June 20. 1997.1-2.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Testimony 
bv Kent Wiedemann Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs July 25. 1995. 1-4.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f  East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Testimony 
bv Peter Tamoff Under Secretary o f  State for Political Affairs Mav 16. 1996. 1-3.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f East Asian and Pacific Affairs. U.S.-China 
Relations. June 20. 1997. 1-4.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f Public Affairs Washington D C..
Ambassador Charlene Barshefskv. U.S. Trade Representative. USTR Testimony 
before the House Wavs and Means Trade Subcommittee June 11. 1996. 1-4.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f Public Affairs Washington D.C.. China and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). June 3. 1997. 1-2.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f  Public Affairs Washington D C .. China’s 
Military Modernization. June 3. 1997. 1-2.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f Public Affairs Washington D.C.. Global 
Human Rights Violations. (Current Policy No. 1164), 1-4.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f Public Affairs Washington D.C.. Freedom 
and World Prosperity. (Current Policy No. 1210), 1-3.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f Public Affairs Washington D C .. U.S. 
Actions Toward China. (Current Policy No. 1247), 1-5.
United States Department o f State Bureau o f Pubic Affairs Washington D C.. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
Promise o f Pacific Economie Cooperation. (Current Policy No. 1208), 1-3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Graduate College 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Thomas Laszlo Dorogi
Local Address:
8028 Cimarron Ridge Dr. #201 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
Home Address:
8028 Cimarron Ridge Dr. #201 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
Degrees:
Bachelor o f Arts, History, 1999 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Special Honors and Awards:
The John S. Wright Award For Best Graduating History Major, 1999-2000 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas (Department of History)
Thesis Title: Tainted Perceptions: Liberal-Democracy and American Popular Images o f 
China.
Thesis Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Dr. Sue Fawn Chung, Ph. D.
Committee Member, Dr. Jay A. Coughtry, Ph. D.
Committee Member, Dr. Chris Rasmussen, Ph. D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, Dr. Paul Schollmeier, Ph. D.
119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
